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Abstract 
The study was undertaken to investigate 
organizational readiness for change to a total quality 
management (TQM) paradigm as the corporate-wide strategy 
within a long-term care facility. The focus of the study 
was on leadership values and organizational cultural 
characteristics that could either accelerate or impede the 
change process at The Public Hospital. structurally, the 
~tudy included 'three distinct components. The first 
component examined the management philosophy outlined by 
Deming (1986) and his contemporary Juran (1989) in order 
to determine what leadership values best support the new 
Total Quality Management paradigm. Secondly, this 
information was compared to present leadership values at 
The Public Hospital with the purpose of identifying 
opportunities for improvement within the organization's 
current culture as the hospital moves toward the desired 
TQM culture. The final component, a roadmap, was 
developed to reflect the most appropriate direction for 
organizational change at The Public Hospital. 
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CHAPTER ONE: THE PROBLEM 
Introduction 
The ultimate outcome for Quality Assurance (QA) 
programs within health care has been to produce 
observable, measurable improvements in patient care. Yet, 
for all the financial and human resources expended by 
hospitals, QA has fallen short of expectations (American 
Health Consultants, 1990; Wilson, 1992). The dilemma is 
two-fold. Not only have QA programs been unable to secure 
improved patient outcomes, they have also managed to 
generate a fair bit of animosity among hospital personnel. 
Both issues are rooted in the same basic problem: the 
present management approach of appraisal and inspection as 
the mainstay of quality assurance activities (Green,1991; 
Wilson, 1987). Inspection creates an uncomfortable 
working environment, encouraging a culture of blame and 
distrust (Berwick, Godfrey & Roessner, 1990; Deming, 
1986). These two characteristics, according to Jones and 
Bearley (1986) are common behaviors within dysfunctional 
organizations. Berwick, Godfrey, and Roessner (1990) 
suggest that blaming as a dysfunctional response is the 
result of a sole focus on individual performance, whether 
that of the janitor or the cardiologist, in the absence of 
other influencing factors. They refer to this folly as 
tantamount to a "sort and shoot" mentality. Such a 
climate creates a kind of defensive posturing that can 
lead to cover-ups, micro-management, finger pointing, and 
pervasive anxiety. A cycle of fear is set in motion, a 
situation that can be extremely destructive for the 
individual and the organization. Within this culture, 
quality cannot be produced or delivered. 
Other inadequacies inherent in a quality assurance 
approach include: the attempt to address quality issues 
too late--after the service is complete, inattention to 
escalating quality costs while productivity declines, and 
adherence to a "fire-fighting" mentality, which place the 
organization in a perpetual state of reactive management. 
The truth is that not much can be done to improve quality 
until health care administrators understand how to manage 
effectively and what leadership in total quality 
management (Juran, 1989) with a commitment to continuous 
quality improvement (Deming, 1986) can offer their 
organizations (Grucic & O'Sullivan, 1991). This will 
require insight into why change is desirable, 
understanding of the theories and methodologies of total 
quality management, and a top level willingness to work 
for change. 
statement of the Problem 
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This study will clarify The Public Hospital's present 
leadership beliefs and values, and determine how these are 
upheld within the behavioral norms of the corporate 
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culture. In so doing, the study will assist the 
researcher in understanding the organization's readiness 
for change. Are the fundamental leadership values and 
behaviors at The Public Hospital capable of supporting the 
Board of Governor's decision to base corporate strategy on 
the principles and philosophy of total quality management? 
Research Questions 
Subsequent questions are: 
1. What are the fundamental leadership values currently 
supporting the corporate culture and driving 
organizational performance? 
2. How are those values expressed in behavioral norms? 
3. Does the present cultural and behavioral make-up of 
the hospital support Deming's principles to: 
#1. Create constancy of purpose for improvement 
of product and service. 
#5. Find problems. It is management's job to 
work continually on improving the system. 
#8. Drive out fear so that everyone may work 
effectively for the company. 
#9. Break down barriers between departments. 
#12. Remove barriers that rob employees of their 
pride in workmanship. 
(Gitlow & Gitlow, 1987, p. 20) 
Background of the Problem 
The Public Hospital, a long-term care facility in 
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south central Ontario, has worked diligently since 1987 to 
develop a quality assurance program that would satisfy 
external accreditors (i.e., Canadian council on Health 
Facilities Accreditation (CCHFA) Standards), external 
regulators, the Public Hospitals Act, and fulfill the 
internal expectations of high quality patient care. For a 
chronic care and rehabilitation institution the issue of 
quality of care is especially salient as the facility 
provides a home for those hospitalized from a few months 
to as many as three or more years (in 1991 The Public's 
average length of stay was 152 days). Quality of patient 
life and quality of work life for those staff interacting 
with the same patients over extended periods of time are 
fundamental to satisfactory outcomes. 
In October 1990, after three years of attempting to 
implement QA and finding themselves generally unhappy with 
the results of their efforts, The Public Hospital's 
Quality Management Committee recommended a change from the 
traditional QA approach in favor of "continuous quality 
improvement" (Deming, 1986; Juran, 1989). Through pilot 
studies held at The Public Hospital to test the 
appropriateness of the application of TQM in health care, 
through informal discussions with selected senior 
managers, and as an outcome of a presentation to the Board 
of Governor's Quality Assurance Committee, a 
recommendation from the staff Quality Management committee 
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was accepted by the Board of Governors of The Public 
Hospital. The recommendation stated, 
That The (Public) Hospital Board of Governors and 
senior managers begin immediately to seek education in 
TQM/CQI so as to adopt and use the theories and 
methodologies of TQM/CQI as their corporate management 
strategy (Minutes of the meeting, Board of Governors, 
The Public Hospital, December 23, 1991). 
Plesk (1990), suggests that three preconditions must 
be present to precipitate the change process: a tension 
for change, an awareness of alternatives, and confidence 
that change can happen. In the case of The Public 
Hospital, tension for change was generated by two major 
factors--a long-standing belief by the staff quality 
management committee that the existing QA program was not 
contributing to significant organizational improvement, 
and a failing health care economic environment attested to 
in a memo forwarded from the then Deputy Minister of 
Health, ontario advising hospitals in ontario that a 
deficit position was no longer acceptable. Ministry 
officials cautioned that deficit recovery plans were 
expected by December 6, 1991 from all hospitals projecting 
a fiscal deficit position for 1991/92 (see Appendix A). 
The Ministry of Health (MOH) directive of a 1% budget 
increase for 1992/93 and a 0.5% increase for 1993/94 
aroused further anxiety in ontario hospital administrators 
still reeling from a 29% wage increase endorsed by the 
ontario Hospital Association for allocation to registered 
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nurses during 1991 contract negotiations. 
The acceptance of the staff Quality Management 
Committee's recommendation by the Board of Governors 
demonstrated that an alternative to the current management 
approach had been recognized and endorsed. The next 
challenge would be to build confidence in the organization 
leadership's ability to change. The researcher, as the 
Director of staff Development and Quality Management, had 
been given the task of building confidence while 
simultaneously coaching The Public Hospital's leadership 
through the planning and the implementation stages of the 
change. 
The move into TQM constituted a paradigm shift that 
would challenge the very heart of The Public Hospital, its 
corporate culture. The adoption of a TQM philosophy meant 
a redirection of core corporate values from finance-driven 
mental models (quality follows cost) toward those that 
support quality-driven decision making (cost follows 
quality). It would be a challenging undertaking for The 
Public's leaders to commit to a long-range quality-based 
view of continuous improvement versus the short-term, 
quarterly-based quick fix approach (Kilmann, 1989). 
Essentially, the hospital Board and management team would 
be asked to abandon the quality assurance program in favor 
of a management system embracing continuous quality 
improvement. This change would require the use of data 
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collection activities, the creation of service models bent 
on customer satisfaction, the assessment of the utility of 
the hierarchical structure for decision-making and those 
political processes that support it, a reduction in 
bureaucratic controls by the introduction of processes to 
encourage employee self-control, the establishment of 
cross-functional and interhierarchical communication 
networks through teamwork (Grucic & O'Sullivan, 1991), the 
redressing of organizational goals in terms of quality 
planning, and visible advocacy for participative 
management. Moreover, the organization would need to 
establish a collective vision, blending idealism and 
realism, to inspire employees yet retain balance during 
the enormous internal pressures exerted throughout the 
transformative process. 
Definition of Terms 
Behavioral norms are those behaviors within an 
organizational culture that are acceptable and reinforced, 
"the result of a pattern of antecedents-behaviors-
consequences." (Luthans & Thompson, 1990, p. 340) 
Bureaucracy refers to the traditional hierarchical 
organizational model distinguished by controls, generally 
in the form of policy and procedures, and by 
unidirectional communication patterns. Within the 
bureaucracy, both controls and communication are top-down 
in nature with very limited information flowing up the 
organizational hierarchy. 
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Bureaucratic governance which "makes use of 
organizational policies and procedures to shape employee 
behavior •.. where employees lack the professional 
competence to perform without being monitored, management 
may rely on policies and rules to govern behavior" (Lake & 
Ulrich, 1990, p. 182). 
Business climate refers to the complex of social, 
economic, and political demands faced by The Public 
Hospital as it reflects on its own reality within the 
health care community. Because the focus for The Public 
Hospital is on long-term care and rehabilitation, 
customers, technologies, and government influences will 
differ from an acute care center. The demands of an aging 
and diverse patient population, pressures from reductions 
in public funding, and the integration of the Ministries 
of Health and Social Services in planning strategies for 
long-term care will influence the business climate in 
which The Public Hospital is able to carry out, with 
excellence, those activities pertinent to a long-term care 
setting. According to Deal and Kennedy (1982), "the 
business environment is the greatest influence in shaping 
a corporate culture" (p. 13). 
Culture is described as "a set of cognitions shared 
by members of a social unit. These cognitions are 
acquired through social learning and socialization 
processes that expose individuals to a variety of 
culture-bearing elements. These elements include the 
observable activities and interactions, communicated 
information, and material artifacts that form the social 
experience" (Rousseau, 1990, p. 154). 
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Cultural capability builds strategic unity which is 
fundamental to successful organizational transformation. 
It refers to the ability of organizational leaders to 
create a shared mindset, " a uniform way of thinking, 
perceiving, and valuing both the goals of an organization 
and the processes used to reach those goals" (Lake & 
Ulrich, 1990, p. 55). 
Leadership capability applies to the leadership 
competencies necessary for diagnosing organizational 
problems and potentials and for managing change through 
flexible, responsive corporate structures, processes, and 
activities. 
Leverage point is "anything that a manager can change 
in the organization, such as rules, procedures, 
objectives, and the acquisition of skills" (Kilmann, 1989, 
p. 12). 
Mental models are "deeply ingrained assumptions, 
generalizations, or even pictures or images that influence 
how we understand the world and how we take action" 
(Senge, 1990, p. 8). 
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Organizational capability is "a business's ability to 
establish internal structures and processes that influence 
its members to create organization-specific competencies 
and thus enable the business to adapt to changing customer 
and strategic needs" (Lake & Ulrich, 1990, p. 40). 
Total Quality Management is "a strategic, integrated 
management system for achieving customer satisfaction 
which involves all managers and employees and uses 
quantitative methods to continuously improve an 
organization's processes" (U.S. Federal Quality 
Institute, 1989 as cited in Hull, 1990). Total quality 
management, continuous quality improvement and quality 
improvement are inte~changeable throughout the literature, 
although some experts in the field like Batalden (1992), 
Nolan (1992), and Senge (1992) are beginning to refine the 
distinctions among these labels. 
Values are "the basic concepts and beliefs of an 
organization; as such they form the heart of the corporate 
culture" (Deal & Kennedy, 1982, p. 14). 
Delimitations and Scope 
The study was limited to the leadership, Board of 
Governors and the management team, senior and middle 
levels, of a 128-bed, chronic care and rehabilitation 
facility in an urban setting in south central ontario. As 
a separate system within the continuum of health care in 
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its locale and in ontario, the cultural climate of The 
Public is a unique blend of values, beliefs, and practices 
established over more than 80 years of history. 
Outline of the Remainder of the Document 
Throughout the literature review of Chapter Two, the 
reader will be acquainted with Quality Assurance (QA) and 
its fit within the formal organizational structure. The 
reader can also expect to better understand the complex of 
issues that have provoked a tension for change from QA to 
quality improvement within health care. The basics of 
Juran's (1989) and Deming's (1986) shared theory of 
continuous quality improvement will reveal an alternative 
approach selected by the Board of Governors of The Public 
Hospital and the challenges faced as the organization 
moves in the new direction. 
Chapter Three outlines the methodology and instruments 
employed in the assessment of present leadership beliefs 
of The Public Hospital. Tools selected for measurement 
examine currently accepted leadership beliefs, managers' 
and Board members' perception of the ability of The Public 
to manage change effectively, and the explicit values 
contained within the hospital's Mission statement and 
other public documents. 
Chapter Four will provide a description of the 
outcome of the evaluation with a summary of the study 
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findings. Because the primary objective of the evaluation 
is to determine a roadmap for change to TQM, Chapter Five 
will present to the reader the strengths and weaknesses 
faced by The Public as a result of the beliefs and values 
of the management and Board of Governors, The Public 
Hospital's cultural capability for change, and 
recommendations outlining the roadmap for organizational 
change to TQM. 
CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Historical Background 
In 1985 the Canadian Council on Health Care Facility 
Accreditation (CCHFA) mandated that every accredited 
hospital in Canada develop a quality assurance (QA) 
program whose purpose would be to address the ever 
increasing cost of health care delivery and monitor the 
outcome of that expenditure. In essence, two questions 
were uppermost in the minds of hospital accreditors, 
regulators, and administrators: Are we doing things 
right? What is our outcome in both service and cost? The 
answer to these questions, it was hoped, would force 
hospitals into accepting accountability for service 
outcomes and cost of service provision inasmuch as 
hospital expenditures were accounting for at least 40% of 
the Canadian health budget (Kushner & Rachlis, 1989). 
Ontario alone was spending, and continues to spend, one 
third of the Provincial budget on health care, an annual 
amount in excess of $17 billion dollars (as reported in 
November 1991 in a speech at the District Health Council 
conference by M. K. Lindberg, Assistant Deputy Minister, 
Consumer Health, Ontario). Through quality assurance, it 
was believed that the Canadian tax-payer would be 
convinced that health care was offering good dollar value. 
In Ontario, curriculum in QA theory and practice was 
developed under the guidance of the ontario Hospital 
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Association and taught in virtually every ontario Hospital 
interested in maintaining accreditation status. The 
training program was based on principles of adult learning 
and designed to fit the traditional formal organizational 
model (Wilson, 1987). structure, process and outcome were 
the key elements of a QA program with the emphasis 
increasingly being placed on outcome (Green, 1991; Wilson, 
1987) . 
Tension for Change 
As QA programs matured, a new controversy arose. It 
became imperative not only to question if things were 
being done right (an outcome focus), but also whether the 
right things were being done (Deming, 1986; Drucker, 1985; 
Juran, 1989). For example, in the late 1980s, concern was 
growing over whether certain surgical interventions (e.g., 
coronary by-pass, Caesarian section, hysterectomy) needed 
to be performed at all. Studies of physician practice 
patterns confirmed wide regional variations (Fulton & 
Sutherland, 1988; Kushner & Rachlis, 1989). Typical 
hospital responses to rising costs and awareness of risk 
were the creation of two more departments in addition to 
the quality assurance department. Larger urban acute care 
hospitals such as Toronto Sunnybrook, Children's Hospital 
of Eastern ontario in ottawa, and the McMaster Medical 
Center in Hamilton were especially quick to establish 
15 
separate departments for quality assurance, risk and 
utilization management. This strategy only served to 
promote expansion of an already burdened bureaucracy. 
However, in October of 1991, the ontario Ministry of 
Health informed all hospitals expecting a fiscal 1991/92 
deficit to submit a deficit recovery plan by December 6th 
(see Appendix A). with a promise of a 1% increase in 
hospital-based funding for fiscal 1992/93 and later, a 
0.5% increase for 1993/94, the Ministry of Health set into 
motion a tension for change unprecedented in health care 
in ontario. If health care, like other industries, were 
to survive and remain competitive through "doing better 
with less" (Hull, 1990), then the manufacturing sector 
notion of change through quality improvement would need to 
permeate the entire hospital system--structure, process, 
and ultimately outcome. 
Hierarchical structures and Quality 
within a hierarchical structure, the organizational 
chart, as bureaucratic map, is purposeful for defining 
functional divisions within the company and for indicating 
reporting channels for responsibility and protocol. It 
would follow that management fixation with the formal 
structure could be, in large part, an impediment to the 
provision of quality. Organizational charts in fact 
represent "managerial cultural assumptions ... [which] 
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dominate managerial thinking about strategy, structure, 
and systems" (Schein, 1986). The formal bureaucracy has 
historically encouraged "segmentalism •.. [which] is 
concerned with compartmentalizing actions, events, and 
problems and keeping each piece isolated from the others" 
(Kanter, 1983, p. 28). Traditional quality assurance 
programs integrated well with the formal organizational 
model but they failed to unify organizational visions of 
quality and service excellence. QA programs were trapped 
within the segmentalism of the hierarchy which was itself 
incapable of producing quality outcomes. Many current 
authors (Aburdene & Naisbitt, 1985; Denlinger & Emshoff, 
1991; Deming, 1986; Drucker, 1985; Juran, 1989; Kanter, 
1983; Kilmann, 1989; Lake & Ulrich, 1991; Senge, 1990) 
have voiced an alternative to the hierarchical structure. 
They advocate the need for corporate restructuring, 
flattening senior level management, and problem solving in 
teams--a move away from reductionist management practices 
toward an organic, integrated approach. 
Segmental ism and Change 
Mental models held by traditional senior managers and 
hospital Boards have restricted clear understanding of the 
association among quality, productivity and cost. For 
years, health care has been finance-driven, believing that 
quality should follow cost. Subsequently, decision-making 
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based on the primacy of quality has proved to be an 
onerous task for health care administrators holding rigid 
financial mind-sets about how to manage. Quality 
assurance, considered by senior managers as abstract and 
without real cost-benefit merit, was delegated down the 
corporate ladder, and eventually subjugated to the good 
will of the individual department supervisor. As the 
assurance of quality assumed the role of an 
intradepartmental issue, subsystems were further 
optimized, cementing the segmentalist mentality. 
Essentially, quality problems, isolated and separated from 
the whole, have been solved independently and 
intradepartmentally. Indeed, for department managers to 
admit that their functional area could be influencing some 
other segment would be incomprehensible. However, to 
blame other departments or individuals for their problems 
proved quite acceptable (Kanter, 1983). Berwick (1989) 
and Berwick, Godfrey and Roessner (1990) refer to this 
aspect of traditional quality assurance as the search for 
"bad apples," an activity involving inspection against a 
predetermined set of standards which results in sorting 
the good from the bad. Consequently, energy squandered in 
territorial skirmishes has depleted vigor available for 
innovation, co-operation (Kaluzny, 1989), and change 
(Aburdene & Naisbitt, 1985; Argyris, 1990; DeVanna & 
Tichy, 1986; Denlinger & Emshoff, 1991; Kanter, 1983; 
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Senge, 1990). 
Companies where segmentalist approaches dominate 
find it difficult to innovate or to handle change. 
Change threatens to disturb the neat array of 
segments, and so changes are isolated in one segment 
and are not allowed to touch any oth.ers. In 
searching for the right compartment in which to 
isolate a problem, those operating segmentally are 
letting the past--the existing structure--dominate 
the future. The system is designed to protect 
against change, to protect against deviation from a 
pre-determined central thrust, and to ensure that 
individuals have sufficient awe and respect for this 
course to maintain their role in it without 
question--though they may fight over their 
share of the proceeds. (Kanter, 1983, p. 29) 
Jones and Bearley (1987) support the notion of 
resistance to change, either overtly or passively, as 
characteristic of a dysfunctional organization. other 
characteristics include blaming, finger-pointing and 
sabotage. Aburdene and Naisbitt (1985) believe that 
hierarchical structures contribute to organization 
dysfunction, 
The hierarchial structure where everyone has a 
superior and everyone has an inferior is corrupting 
of the human spirit--no matter how well it served us 
during the industrial period. (p. 41) 
The formal organization continues to value an 
environment which demands finance-based results. 
standards, objectives, and controls continue to be the 
mainstay of bureaucratic mental models that demand 
management by outcome. In fact, management by objectives 
or results is counterproductive (Joiner, 1988; Starcher, 
1992). 
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In contrast, Scholtes (1988) supports Deming~s (1986) 
vision of effective management as process directed, 
Management by results pays little, if any, attention 
to processes and systems: the real capabilities of 
the organization as a whole. So these standards and 
goals are nothing but arbitrary numerical goals. 
Eventually, workers, supervisors, and managers get 
caught up in games; looking good overshadows a 
concern for the organization's long term success. 
Too often, they lose sight of the larger purpose of 
the work they do. (Scholtes, 1988, p. 1-v) 
Countable results receive top priority by managers and 
Board members who have discounted the value of quality in 
cost and productivity. In reality, desired numerical 
goals may be obtained but at the cost of worker morale and 
organizational culture. "When goals are met, the entire 
company can boast of its performance. But this attitude 
wreaks havoc with quality and worker morale along the way" 
(Scholtes, 1988, p. 1-vi). Management by results not only 
supports Berwick's (1989) theory of bad apples by 
perpetuating fear and anxiety but it also induces sabotage 
(Jones & Bearley, 1987) as employees attempt to circumvent 
the system rather than to engage in working toward 
improvement. 
This charade fosters guarded communication and minor, 
sometimes major dishonesty. The greater the stress 
on reaching unattainable goals, especially when 
someone's career is on the line, the more likely it 
is that reports and numbers will be given a face 
lift. (Scholtes, 1988, p. 1-7) 
Most serious of all weaknesses built into 
hierarchical management is the blind eye turned toward 
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customer concerns (Berwick, 1989; Berwick, Godfrey, & 
Roessner, 1990; Joiner, 1988; Juran, 1989; Lake & Ulrich, 
1990; Senge, 1990). Deming (1986) is careful to point out 
that customers are both internal and external to the 
organization. Many hospital mission statements and 
philosophies address quality of work life (internal 
customers) and quality of patient life (external 
customers), but with little understanding of the 
ingredients of such phrases. 
Finally, a segmented organization can tolerate, and 
thus promote, only limited learning (Argyris, 1990; 
~anter, 1983; Senge, 1990). Because, in the approach of 
traditional quality assurance, problem identification and 
solution has supported "single loop learning" (Argyris & 
Schon, 1978), continued adherence to quality assurance 
methodologies may be'a key contributor to "organizational 
learning disabilities" (Senge, 1990, p. 18). Single loop 
learning is capable of only superficially addressing 
problems within an organization. 
Organizational learning involves the detection and 
correction of error. When the error detected and 
corrected permits the organization to carryon its 
present policies or achieve its present objectives, 
then that error-detection-and-correction process is 
single-loop learning. Single-loop learning is like a 
thermostat that learns when it is too hot or too cold 
and turns the heat on or off. The thermostat can 
perform this task because it can receive information 
(the temperature of the room) and take corrective 
action. (Argyris & Schon, 1978, pp. 2-3) 
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The Alternative 
Genuine quality improvement requires that errors be 
detected and corrected in such a way that the 
organizational culture, structures and goals are modified 
to enhance the organizations' capability to provide 
service quality. Such organizational transformation 
requires "double-loop or reconstructive learning" (Argyris 
& Schon, 1978; Friedlander, 1983, as cited in Conway, 
1985). 
In reconstructive learning the organization questions 
its premises, purposes, values. For individuals 
these are represented in one's goals, principals, 
life-style, beliefs. For the organization they are 
represented by its goals, policies, and norms ... 
Reconstructive learning calls for in-depth 
confrontation of old patterns and the development of 
radically different new ones. It suggests the 
construction of new goals, policies, norms, styles 
rather than simple modification of the old. 
(Friedlander as cited in Conway, 1985, p. 10) 
When formal bureaucratic structures are abandoned and 
team problem solving initiated, double-loop learning is 
possible. It is the team's job to search for root causes 
within systems that include interrelationships, patterns 
of change, processes within processes, as well as linear 
cause and effect. Ultimately, work life is made richer by 
helping workers and managers see together the deeper 
patterns and meanings behind events and details (Argyris, 
1990; Denlinger & Emshoff, 1991; DeVanna & Tichy, 1986; 
Morris, 1987; Scholtes, 1988; Senge, 1990). 
Because teams are held accountable to effect and 
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monitor the changes recommended from their problem 
analyses (Juran, 1989), they directly experience the 
consequences of their decisions and gain an understanding 
of a ripple effect throughout the organization that may 
last for years (Senge, 1990). Analysis and decision-
making are seen as important and team outcomes are owned 
by the particular project team. Senge (1990) believes 
that along with systems thinking, personal mastery, mental 
models, and building shared vision, team learning is one 
of the five essential components of effective 
organizations. 
When teams are truly learning, not only are they 
producing extraordinary results but the individuals 
are growing more rapidly than could have occurred 
otherwise. • .• Team learning is vital because teams, 
not individuals, are the fundamental learning unit in 
modern organizations. This 'is where the rubber meets 
the road; unless teams can learn, the organization 
cannot learn. (Senge, 1990, p. 10) 
Kilmann (1989) concurs that to appreciate the 
complexity and interconnectedness of organizations there 
is a need to view them from a three-dimensional 
perspective. He refers to the organization as a "complex 
hologram," far beyond the scope of understanding it as 
either a simple machine or as an open system. 
Organizations must be viewed as holographic images. 
Otherwise, managers, consultants and academics 
will see only a small portion of the total picture ••• 
Without the holographic view, most of what goes on 
and must be managed for success would be beyond 
everyone's perceptual reach. (Kilmann, 1989, 
pp. 9-10). 
Such a dynamic view of organizations would encourage 
multiple approaches and varied inputs for successful 
decision-making. 
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Deming (1986), a leader in the modern day industrial 
quality transformation, has outlined such a management 
strategy, the nucleus of which contains 14 points 
detailing his theory of continuous quality improvement 
(see Appendix B). Central to his and Juran's (1989) total 
quality management (TQM) paradigm are two important 
requirements for the continuous improvement of quality 
whether in products or services--an organization must 
develop a common constancy of purpose aimed squarely at 
customer satisfaction and must use teamwork and 
statistical tools to measure, monitor, and improve work 
processes (Deming, 1986; Denlinger & Emshoff, 1991; Gitlow 
& Gitlow, 1987; Juran, 1989). Unlike quality circles, 
quality improvement teams are cross-functional and 
interhierarchical in nature (Deming, 1986; Juran, 1989). 
Within such an arrangement workers and managers 
collaborate to take advantage of organizational 
opportunities for improvement. Team membership is 
organized around the process issue under investigation, 
spanning the entire process to include those working up-
stream and down-stream. As process questions are revealed 
and knowledge evolves, team membership may be reorganized. 
In this way, team arrangements and the problem-solving 
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process remain fluid and adaptable. Teamwork itself is 
task oriented, using data collection methods and 
statistical tools for data analysis (Deming, 1986; Gitlow 
& Gitlow, 1987; Gitlow, Gitlow, Oppenheim & Oppenheim, 
1989; Juran, 1989; Walton, 1986). The integration of 
qualitative and quantitative problem analysis forces the 
organizational system into a transactional experience, 
organic in nature. To elect an organic approach to 
management is to choose empowerment for the employee: "The 
world is actualized by our investigation of it. Knowing 
is an interactive process between the knower and the 
known" (Salz, 1990, p. 393). 
Kilmann (1989), like his contemporaries, strongly 
supports participative management practices and teamwork; 
however, he advocates that effective teamwork, the pooling 
of process knowledge and worker expertise to get results, 
is impossible in the absence of a supportive 
organizational culture. Therefore, it is his contention 
that any successful change begins with attention to the 
organization's culture and the values, assumptions, and 
psyche that are its mainstay. 
Every organization has an invisible quality 
--a certain style, a way of doing things--that 
ultimately determines whether success will be 
achieved. Ironically, what cannot be seen or 
touched may be more powerful than the dictates 
of anyone person or any formally documented 
system. To understand the soul of the organization, 
therefore, requires that we travel below the 
charts, rule books, machines, and buildings into 
the underground world of corporate culture. 
(Kilmann, 1989, p. 49-50) 
Although quality assurance has not been the panacea 
previously expected for health care (Berwick, Godfrey & 
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Roessner, 1990; Laffel, 1990; Wilson, 1992), the drive for 
service quality continues. Rapidly escalating costs, 
increased consumer dissatisfaction, rising litigation and 
compensatory claims, wide variation in practice patterns, 
and government redistribution of funding are pressuring 
health care organizations toward change (Berwick, Godfrey 
& Roessner 1990; Kushner & Rachlis, 1989; Snedden, 1987). 
Evidence of the commitment for systemic modification is 
the recent decision by the ontario Ministry of Health to 
adopt the management methodologies of Deming (1986) and 
Juran (1989) into their organizational structures and 
processes. In addition, CCHFA has assembled a task force 
to address the issue of how to incorporate Deming's theory 
of continuous quality improvement (CQI) into their 
standards for 1993. The direction for The Public Hospital 
had been set by the Board--to adopt management practices 
reflective of a continuous quality improvement paradigm 
and aligned with the example being set by the Ministry of 
Health and CCHFA. However, before mobilization for 
corporate change could take place, the question of the 
organization's leadership and cultural capability to 
change needed to be addressed. 
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The Organizational context 
The Public Hospital was built on the present site in 
1926 as a sanatorium for consumptive (tuberculosis) 
patients. Throughout its history, it has served as a 
sanatorium, an acute care facility, a hospital for chest 
diseases and, since 1975, a chronic care and in-house 
rehabilitation center. As such, The Public Hospital is 
the only free-standing chronic care and in-house 
rehabilitation facility in its Region. Therefore, the 
chronic care catchment area from which the hospital could 
draw is approximately 55,296. This number represents the 
estimated number of people over the age of 65 years, a 
19.4% increase of people over the age of 65 years since 
1986 (Statistics Canada 1991 figures, as cited in Jodoin, 
1992). The catchment area for rehabilitation services, 
taking account of the entire population of the Region, 
approximately 370,000, is much broader. Because of its 
specialized services, The Public Hospital has enjoyed a 
niche within the health care market--a situation that has 
allowed the hospital to acquire specialty status within 
its community and to have established a long and honored 
tradition in the delivery of care and service. 
Presently, the hospital has a chronic care population 
capacity for 102 patients and a 22-bed in-house 
rehabilitation unit. Hospital staff treat primarily older 
chronic patients (65 years of age and older) although 
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younger adults with chronic conditions are also admitted. 
The rehabilitation population consists of a mix of adult 
age groups whose presenting problems may include 
amputations, cerebral vascular accidents and fractures 
(Jodoin, 1992). Programs offered to achieve and maintain 
optimal functional levels, comfort and independence for 
chronic care patients include palliative care, respite 
care, slow-paced rehabilitation, and intervention 
strategies for chronic obstructive lung disease and 
tuberculosis. In the past two to three years, there has 
been an increase in a younger chronic care population of 
patients suffering from multiple sclerosis. A community 
outreach program specific to multiple sclerosis has been 
designed to provide therapeutic and supportive assistance 
to caregivers and patients from the hospital and the 
community. 
The medical manpower of The Public is accounted for by 
six physicians, one of whom is a Medical Director who also 
operates the hospital's outpatient clinic. The Medical 
Director attends annually to approximately 3,500 (1991-92 
figures) visits for patients with respiratory related 
diseases. An on-site physician regularly attends to 
chronic care patients, and four consulting physicians, 
externally contracted, assist in meeting the needs of both 
chronic and rehabilitative patients. 
The Chief Executive Officer (CEO)! Executive Director 
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(ED) and four Assistant Executive Directors (AEDs)--
Patient Care, Hospital and Paramedical Services, Finance, 
and Human Resources--assist the CEO on the senior 
management team. Reporting to this group are 19 
department managers, who together comprise the middle 
management team. Because of this reporting structure, the 
Public Hospital's managerial hierarchy is considered quite 
flat. 
Employee complement fluctuates at approximately 300 
employees, both full- and part-time. The Nursing 
Department accounts for the largest number of employees, 
approximately 165. Dietary Department and Housekeeping are 
the next largest. 
According to the ontario Hospital Association, the 
Board of Governors is accountable to "establish the 
mission and nature of the hospital" (as cited in Wilson, 
1988, p. 8). There are 27 members of the Board of 
Governors at The Public Hospital, 18 voting and seven 
ex-officio members. The two remaining have been appointed 
Honorary Life Governors and are inactive members. 
A Patient Advisory Council was established in 1990 
to provide a forum wherein issues important to patient 
institutional-related lifestyle preferences could be 
heard. At the time of its inception, dissatisfaction with 
the quality of care was brought to the attention of the 
CEO. Out of this dialogue, the senior management team and 
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the Board solicited the research skills of a psychologist, 
Dr. K. Belicki, to undertake a quality of patient life 
study. Over the course of two years, this study broadened 
to include quality of worklife from the frontline and 
department manager perspective. The survey report became 
available November 25, 1992 to all who had participated in 
the process. Some of the findings have been incorporated 
as supportive information for this study. 
In addition to paid staff, The Public Hospital has 
approximately 25 volunteers who assist in patient feeding, 
personal care, outings, recreation and leisure activities. 
A glance at the organizational chart graphically depicts 
the reporting structures throughout the Public (see 
Appendix C). 
The Business Climate 
The services offered by The Public Hospital are part 
of a continuum of care throughout the Region. For the 
past two years, The Public Hospital has been engaged in 
the planning process for an addition to house 52 beds and 
a chronic care Day Hospital Program to accommodate 25 
patients daily. In order to accomplish this, the Public 
Hospital Board of Governors and senior management team 
have initiated a process to involve local providers in the 
planning. Additionally, the hospital leadership solicited 
the services of a local consultant to up-date the hospital 
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on geriatric service needs by evaluating current issues 
with the intention of better understanding future program 
requirements. 
Current Long-Term-Care planning for the city in whiqh 
the hospital is situated is proceeding with the assumption 
that all future chronic care services will be consolidated 
at The Public Hospital with appropriate linkages 
established with acute care centers and home care programs 
(Jodoin, 1992). 
The hospital receives operational dollars from the 
Ministry of Health, ontario. Any approved capital 
projects are funded 60% by the Ministry of Health and 40% 
by the facility. The annual operating budget is 
approximately $12,000,000.00. Fiscal 1992-93 saw a 2% 
increase from the Ministry of Health while 1993-94 has 
been held at 0.5%. The senior management team voluntarily 
froze their salaries in 1992-93 to be better able to meet 
financial demands. The greatest financial pressure is 
salaries, in particular those agreed to by the Ontario 
Nurses' Association and the ontario Hospital Association. 
The agreement took effect prior to the announcement in 
1991 of the limited funding base (2.0%) forthcoming from 
the Ministry. The other employee union at The Public 
Hospital is the Canadian Union of Public Employees. 
CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY AND PROCEDURES 
Design of the Study 
Culture, when viewed as a psychological process of 
perception as well as a social construct, becomes an 
enormous concept to unravel. For the purpose of the 
study, as a descriptive survey, the collection of data was 
narrowed to the examination of corporate values. The 
Mission Statement and the Statement of Philosophy were 
used for their artifact importance. Other sources for 
values analysis included patterns of decision-making and 
communication and styles of interpersonal relationships, 
all of which could be determined through organizational 
behavioral norms principally articulated by the actions of 
the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the senior 
management team. In addition, members of the Board of 
Governors, as leaders and providers of organizational 
direction and purpose, were assessed to indicate whether 
their vision for The Public Hospital was that generally 
shared by members of the hospital management team. In 
viewing each of these origins of corporate values, the 
researcher was able to move from the periphery of the 
organization, the study of artifacts, through to the more 
difficult to assess area of fundamental assumptions that 
support behavioral norms and constitute corporate values 
(Kilmann, 1989; Rousseau, 1990). 
Given the variety of personal, collective, 
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hierarchical, and sub-cultural configurations possible 
within the society of the organization, organizational 
culture research can be viewed from many competing 
perspectives. Therefore, for the purpose of this study, 
it was important to consider both the personal and 
collective level of analysis. Neither quantitative nor 
qualitative research alone is sufficient for the task of 
describing an organization's culture (Dansereau & Alutto, 
1990; Rousseau, 1990). Thus, the study was designed in 
four separate phases and used quantitative surveys, an 
evaluation of artifacts, qualitative interviews, and group 
discussion. Although the activities within each phase are 
the primary sources of information, the researcher's 
personal observations over the course of six years as a 
department manager and educator at The Public Hospital 
also proved a valued origin for understanding the social 
environment. 
Phase One 
In the first phase, Department Managers, Senior 
Managers and Board members were requested to complete 
three questionnaires (see Appendix F). The purpose of the 
questionnaires was to describe the collective perception 
of managers and Board members particular to their 
perception of currently existing restraining and driving 
forces for change, to develop a composite description of 
organizational reaction to change and to survey current 
knowledge about Total Quality Management within the 
management team and Board members. 
Instrumentation 
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The choice of survey instruments had to meet two 
important criteria. First, from the organization's 
perspective, the tools needed to be simple to use and to 
interpret. Because the organization's purpose was to 
establish a baseline by which to measure organizational 
knowledge about TQM as well as cultural progress in the 
application of TQM, tool simplicity and facility were 
important considerations. Secondly, the instruments had 
to achieve the aim of the broader context of the research 
question: to identify organizational characteristics 
indicative of readiness for change in management practice, 
and to determine probable staff reaction to the adoption 
of a new theoretical framework for managers. 
The Quality Improvement Audit for Leaders created by 
Brewer (1990) and based on Deming's (1986) model of 
continuous quality improvement, is comprised of a 100-
item, true-false audit in which six dimensions of quality 
improvement are tapped: (a) leader's attitudes and 
beliefs, (b) leader's knowledge, (c) employee involvement, 
(d) use of data, (e) commitment to quality improvement, 
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and (f) personal leadership style. The tool was selected 
because of its potential to assess personal and 
organizational TQM knowledge and behaviors. To honestly 
appraise the current level of TQM knowledge and behaviors, 
respondents were asked to answer based on what is, rather 
than what should be. The purpose for selection of the 
Quality Improvement Audit for Leaders was to indicate, for 
the researcher, gaps in managers' and Board members' 
present knowledge and beliefs relevant to a quality-
focused organization, and to assess whether prior exposure 
to TQM theory played a role in shaping attitudes and 
beliefs about a quality-focused management paradigm as 
defined by Deming (1986). 
Brewer (1992) describes the instrument as "criterion 
referenced, each item having been validated according to 
research with 27 pieces of research materials including 
Deming" (personal communication, January 1993). According 
to Brewer (1992), the Quality Improvement Audit for 
Leaders has recently been tested at the University of 
Miami where it is reported to have performed very well, 
although no psychometrics were available. 
The Organizational Change Readiness Survey (OCRS) and 
Organizational Change Orientation Scale (OCOS) (Jones & 
Bearley, 1986) assist organizations to evaluate total 
systems readiness and the systemic reaction to change. 
The OCRS is a 76-item survey tool. The items are 
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classified into five categories: (a) structural readiness, 
having the capability to reorganize readily in response to 
external pressures, (b) technological readiness, having 
the ability to remain current and open to innovation, (c) 
climatic readiness, having a supportive atmosphere, (d) 
systemic readiness, having systems in place to facilitate 
change, and (e) people readiness, having people who wbrk 
well together and who can tolerate ambiguity. Individual 
responses to change are measured through the OCOS, a 36-
item scale. Possible responses are classified as (a) 
functional, (b) non-functional, and (c) dysfunctional. 
Little data exists on the internal reliability of 
either instrument, although the authors continue to 
collect data on the instruments' performance (Russo, 
1992). Russo (1992) has described the OCOS and the OCRS 
as instruments developed by Jones and Bearley (1986) for 
the purpose of organizational training. As such, the 
instruments chosen were appropriate for use within the 
context of a descriptive survey of The Public Hospital 
wherein shared perception was fundamental to the 
qualitative portion of the study. In addition, two other 
important factors were considered--ease of use, and the 
potential to graphically depict a baseline of current 
organizational readiness, and reaction to change. The 
same surveys applied three to five years hence would be 
familiar; thus, accessible and acceptable for 
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organizational re-evaluation. 
Each of the surveys used has been "quantified 
according to the rules of statistical analysis" (HRD 
Quarterly, 1991, summer, p. 1) and as such was considered 
to be valid and reliable for use in a descriptive survey 
of a single organization. 
Sample and population 
Twenty-two staff--the CEO, four senior and 17 
department managers, and nine Board members completed the 
surveys. This represents 89.5% of the management 
population and 50.0% of the Board of Governors. The 
remaining 10.5% of the manager group is accounted for by 
one individual, absent at the time of questionnaire 
completion, and the researcher. 
Data Collection 
Each manager was provided with a letter of purpose 
for the study (Appendix D) and asked to read, sign, and 
date the letter to indicate their agreement to 
participate. The managers'completed their questionnaires 
as part of a department heads' meeting, for which the CEO 
had provided the time. Although the researcher planned to 
keep survey results of both managerial levels and the 
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Board separate, this did not prove to be possible. 
Because all managers, senior and departmental, requested 
assurance that there would be no way to identify 
individual participants, the opportunity to separate 
senior from department manager responses was lost. 
However, any participant who had received prior education 
about the theory and philosophy of Total Quality 
Management was requested to indicate so by making a check 
mark on the outside of his/her questionnaire. Eighteen 
active Board members were sent a package of the three 
questionnaires with an accompanying letter via a mail-out 
(Appendix E). Agreement to participate was obvious by the 
returned questionnaires. Nine (50.0%) completed packages 
were returned. 
Data Analysis 
Analysis of respondents' scores on the Quality 
Improvement Audit for Leaders was based on the aggregate 
scores of two independent groups, managers and Board 
members. In addition, respondents' scores were grouped by 
their TQM knowledge based on whether the respondent had 
received previous exposure to the concepts of total 
quality management. Analysis of variance was employed to 
determine differences in group responses by dependent 
variables, organizational level, managers and Board 
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members, as well as by knowledge, prior exposure to TQM 
information and no prior exposure. Likewise, the OCOS and 
OCRS scores were aggregated into group scores then 
examined according to level and knowledge. 
The OCRS aggregated scores for each group, managers 
and Board members, were plotted separately on a force 
field chart (Jones & Bearley, 1986; Spier, 1973) for 
visual analysis and comparison. With both the OCRS and 
the OCOS, surveying at the personal level followed by 
aggregating scores at the collective level provided a 
clearer understanding of personal perception (between 
subjects) and collective perception (within groups). 
The range in variation of individual reports about 
personal reaction to change and in collective perceptions 
about organizational change readiness provided a common 
platform to begin the qualitative component of the study. 
In addition to the quantitative data, the interview phase 
was made richer by the use of the hospital's most relevant 
artifact, the Mission Statement. 
Phase Two 
The written Mission statement makes the 
organizational purpose, vision, and values explicit (see 
Appendix G). Phase Two consisted of an examination of the 
hospital's most recent Mission Statement and of a 
periodical commissioned by the hospital's Board of 
Governors and published during the course of the study, 
The [Public] Hospital: contributing to the Community's 
Continuing Care Needs. 
Data Analysis 
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The method for analysis of the Mission statement and a 
recent publication, The [Public] Hospital: Contributing 
to the Community's Continuing Care Needs, involved a 
review of the documents to clarify the stated purpose of 
the hospital, and the values by which the hospital defines 
itself in the execution of its stated purpose. 
Phase Three 
Phase Thre~ consisted of loosely structured 
interviews conducted to acquire information about each 
Department Manager's and each Board member's agreement or 
disagreement with the questionnaire results. As well, the 
interviews provided a mechanism to share the collective 
perceptions of each group, Department Management and 
Board. Each participant was asked to comment on the force 
field analysis of his/her own and that of the other group, 
in particular to develop a hypothesis for similarities or 
differences in the aggregated score pattern. In addition, 
each Department Manager was requested to describe his/her 
experience of The Public Hospital's organizational culture 
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and patterns of social relationships. The Department 
Managers were asked, based in their own perception, to 
reveal what they believed to be the organization's 
behavioral norms. In contrast, because Board members are 
not involved in the day-to-day operations of the hospital, 
but through governance have a leadership role, they were 
interviewed about their vision for and understanding of 
the future direction- of The Public Hospital. Examples of 
the question lines are provided in Appendix H. 
Sample and population 
Daniel (1992) and Wilson, O'Hare, and Shipper (1990, 
as cited in Daniel, 1992) found that subordinates are 
better able to assess how supervisors get results than are 
supervisors themselves, whether through self-assessment or 
through performance appraisal mechanisms. Because the 
fundamental values and beliefs of The Public Hospital's 
leadership, the CEO, and the four Assistant Executive 
Directors, were the focus of the study, these individuals 
were excluded from the interview process. Instead, the 
study focused on the ~enior managers' values and beliefs 
as described by their subordinates, the recipients of both 
the words and the deeds of the senior management team. 
Inasmuch as Board members are distant from daily 
management while having the authority and responsibility 
to set direction for the hospital and to oversee the 




Department Managers were interviewed at their 
convenience on site, and Board members either at their 
home or a place of their choosing. All 18 Department 
Managers were interviewed. Four Board members, those 
currently holding roles of leadership and influence at the 
Board level, were approached for an interview. These four 
included the Past Chairman, Present Chairman, 
Vice-Chairman, and the Chairman of Public Relations 
(Appendix H). Three of these individuals consented. with 
subject's consent, all interviews were recorded. If 
subjects expressed discomfort about being recorded, notes 
were taken during the interview. Only two subjects (9.5%) 
indicated a discomfort. All subjects were assured that 
individual audits, scales, and personal comments made 
within and outside the research processes would be kept in 
strict confidence by the researcher and that the results 
of the study would be presented as a composite of all 
subject contributions with no subject-specific 
attributions or observations. The use of direct quotes 
within the text of the research was done in a manner that 
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protects subject anonymity. 
Data Analysis 
All tape-recorded interviews were transcribed verbatim. 
The transcribed text was coded along with the interview 
notes from subjects who refused taping. Coding categories 
included organizational purpose and direction, desired 
image, futuristic thinking, organizational leadership 
style, reward and recognition, behavioral norms, rituals 
and celebrations, and heroes. As the process of sorting 
subjects' comments unfolded, five common themes began to 
surface into more specific groupings: shared vision and 
mission, organizational learning, empowerment, reward and 
recognition, and leadership and behavioral norms. Because 
.the researcher chose to allow data to evolve throughout 
the interview process, some issues such as gender bias 
were included within the interview process only after two 
subjects had voluntarily raised the issue. In view of the 
importance of the finding, those individuals who had not 
been previously asked about their perception of a gender 
bias were surveyed at a later date. Inasmuch as the study 
was evolutionary, it was not always possible to establish 
actual respondent frequencies concerning all categories. 
However, part way through the Department Manager interview 
phase, it became clear that saturation had been reached on 
questions particular to mission, leadership, implicit and 
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explicit values, behavioral norms, reward and recognition. 
Phase Four 
Finally, Phase Four was designed to confirm perceptions 
and attributions verbalized by the Department Managers 
during their interview process. This was accomplished 
within the context of a teaching session designed to 
encourage learners to reflect upon individual and 
collective values. within the context of learning about 
organizational culture as a social construct, explicit 
values and beliefs contained within the hospital's written 
Mission statement were identified and compared to implicit 
values expressed in behavioral norms generated from within 
the group of learners, thus making the implicit generally 
explicit. 
sample and Population 
In early October 1992, formal education in Total 
Quality Management began for 16 Department Managers (the 
remaining two had been requested to participate in the 




The program consisted of ten sessions, each three 
hours in length. Two sessions were presented each Friday 
over a five-week period. The entire learning experience 
was based on principles of adult learning, and used an 
experiential model. To expand their awareness of systems 
thinking and organizational interconnectedness, Department 
Managers were assigned to teams in such a way that they 
would be working with colleagues with whom they would not 
normally interact. 
The teams were taught tools for teamwork (e.g., 
nominal group technique, multivoting, consensus building) 
and were expected to use these skills throughout the 
instructional program. The final day was designed to 
enhance the learners' understanding about corporate 
culture, values and behavioral norms. The topic was 
framed to allow for team participation in the 
identification of explicit values. Each team dissected 
the hospital Mission statement, identified values 
contained therein, and prepared a list of the values. All 
teams were then debriefed by having the researcher 
retrieve and collect the list on a flip chart. The next 
step was to have learners, still working within their 
teams, identify ways in which the values were behaviorally 
demonstrated by themselves and others in daily work. 
Conversely, they were asked to share stories of incidents 
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in which the values may have been compromised. Next, 
teams addressed their belief about the success of The 
Public Hospital in upholding its documented mission, 
vision, and values. The fundamental question put to the 
group was whether The Public Hospital visibly demonstrated 
who it professed to be. The instructor then asked 
participants if, based on their discussions, they believed 
The Public Hospital was ready to move into a TQM paradigm. 
If yes, what were the strengths and if no, why not? 
For research purposes, this educational session 
presented an opportunity to check the validity of the 
interview process. Public disclosure of constructs 
discovered during confidential interviews would confirm 
the pervasiveness and mutuality of assumptions about 
shared vision and values, organizational learning, 
teamwork and empowerment, reward and recognition, and 
leadership. It was reasoned that if Department Managers 
would be willing to disclose their anxieties and 
frustrations publicly, the behavioral norms could be 
openly revealed and the issue of communal fear in the 
workplace could be examined. 
Data Analysis 
Finally, analysis of the group discussion phase of 
the research involved determining how many of the 
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Department Managers would engage in a team discussion 
about The Public Hospital's implicit and explicit values 
as barriers to organizational change. The next level of 
analysis examined how many Department Managers would 
engage in the broader, open-group exercise to reveal the 
same implicit and explicit values. Whether or not 
Department Managers openly revealed the same information 
concerning behavioral norms in the public setting as they 
had in the interview process would confirm the conviction 
of their privately stated perceptions. 
strengths and Limitations 
The overall strength of the design of the study was 
its multidimensional nature that moved from the periphery 
to the core schemata of the organization and its 
leadership. The design also helped the researcher to 
understand the genesis of The Public Hospital, how it came 
to be what it is, and the cultural dynamics that continue 
to support it (Argyris, 1960). Table 1 breaks out, more 
comprehensively, the strengths and limitations of the 
overall study design. 
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Table 1 










and OCRS have limited 
applicability across 
organizations. 
The context in 
which the surveys 
were completed did 
not allow managers 
real choice in a 
decision to take 
part. 
The return rate 
for the Board Group 
was disappointing 
(50%). Not all 
items were 
completed. 
Due to time, 
the review was 
limited to only 
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and fear to speak up 
may have biased some 
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frankly with a 
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the Board to share with 
a subordinate. This 
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communication barrier 
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Undertaking a cultural study of one's own workplace 
presented a challenge for the researcher. It was 
impossible to avoid partiality. However, it was believed 
that the breadth and multidimensional design of the study 
compensated, somewhat, for the researcher's own 
organizational biases. 
CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS 
For the convenience of the reader and ease of 
presentation, the following results have been separated 
into each of the four phases that comprised the study 
design: Phase One, questionnaire results; Phase TWo, 
artifacts; Phase Three, interviews; and Phase Four, group 
discussion. 
Phase One: Questionnaire Findings 
The Quality Improvement Audit for Leaders was 
employed to determine The Public Hospital leadership's 
current knowledge about Total Quality Management concepts. 
Leaders were grouped by level, either management or Board 
membership, and by prior exposure to TQM theory. One 
audit from a Board member was returned incomplete. 
Therefore, eight responses from the Board and 22 from the 
managerial level were analysed. Significant differences 
in responses between the two organizational levels 
surveyed occurred on only one variable in the Quality 
Improvement Audit for Leaders--Commitment to Quality 
Improvement. Analysis of variance showed that managers as 
a group scored significantly lower on their reports of 
commitment than did the nine Board members who returned 
surveys. Table 2 provides a summary of the findings. 
Seventeen of all 30 subjects (56.7%) reported prior 
exposure to TQM, whether formal through the Board of 
Governor's and senior management seminar in April 1992 or 
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Table 2 
Mean Rating for Subjects' Reported Commitment to Quality 
Improvement 
Responses 
For Entire Population 
Manager Group 
Board members** 
* 12.. <.05 












informal, through reading, discussions, membership on the 
Quality Management Committee, etc. Analysis of variance 
showed that previous exposure to the theory of Total 
Quality Management proved to be an important variable in 
how respondents answered the Quality Improvement for 
Leaders Audit sections on Attitudes and Beliefs about 
Quality, and Quality Improvement Principles. Table 3 
shows the distribution of subjects' responses over both 
dependent variables. 
Point biserial correlation was used to analyse 
subjects' prior exposure to TQM concepts with their 
responses to each section in the Quality Improvement Audit 
for Leaders. Prior exposure to TQM theory was moderately 
and positively related to Attitudes and Beliefs about 
Quality and commitment to Quality Improvement, 
~ pt bis = +0.57 and ~ pt bis = +0.60, respectively. This 
finding indicates a relationship between subjects' prior 
exposure to TQM theory and their scores on the audit 
sections concerning knowledge about and commitment to 
basic quality improvement concepts. Seven of 17 subjects 
with prior TQM exposure (77.8%) were Board members, and 
ten (45.4%) were from management. Because Board members 
had an opportunity for structured education at their April 
1992 seminar on TQM, the context of the prior exposure may 
have been one important factor associated with 
participants' scores on quality attitudes and beliefs, and 
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Table 3 
Mean Ratings for Subjects' Reports on Attitudes and Belief 











** R. <.01 
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Attitudes & Beliefs 
Prior Exposure No Prior Exposure 
(N = 17) (N = 13) 
15.06 12.14 
1.68 2.68 











Pearson correlational analysis showed that subjects' 
responses to Attitudes and Beliefs About Quality were 
directly related to their scores on Quality Improvement 
principles. commitment to Quality Improvement was 
'positively correlated with both the Use of Data and 
Involving Employees. A summary of participants' responses 
has been provided within a correlational matrix in Table 
4. 
The Organizational Change Orientation Scale (OCOS), 
the inventory used to assist in the understanding about 
manager and Board member behaviors in change situations, 
showed no statistically significant differences in the 
aggregate responses of each of the two groups on 
predominantly functional, non-functional, or dysfunctional 
reactions to change. However, dysfunctional responses 
approached levels of significance. This may indicate a 
slightly greater inclination toward dysfunctional 
reactions to change situations within the management group 
(see Table 5). 
Because of this finding, further analysis was 
undertaken to determine in which survey statements 
differences might be arising. The analysis revealed that 
responses to the statement, "I do not get involved 
significantly in organizational changes" were 
statistically different between the Board and management 
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Table 4 
Correlations Between Responses on the Quality Improvement 
Audit for Leaders 
Measures 
Measures A B C D E F 
A 
B .4207* 
C -.0974 -.1726 
D .1918 .0407 .2983 
E .2575 .1734 .5528* .6261** 
F .0326 -.2384 .2679 .2045 .2762 
Note. A = Attitudes and Beliefs about Quality Improvement 
B = Quality Improvement Principles 
C = Involving Employees 
D = Use of Data 
E = Commitment to Quality Improvement 
F = Personal Leadership Style 
* p. <.01, one-tailed, **p. <.001, one-tailed 
Table 5 
Mean Ratings for Subjects' Reports on Dysfunctional 



















groups. As well, two additional statements showed 
differences, "I hide my opposition to organizational 
change," and "My response to organizational change is to 
ask, What's in it for me?" Table 6 presents a summary of 
the overall findings. 
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Analysis of variance in responses to the 
Organizational Change Readiness Survey showed 
statistically significant differences in the perceptions 
of the management group and the Board of Governors on both 
barriers to and supports for change. However, only one 
survey category reached a level of statistical 
significance in terms of barriers to change. People 
Readiness was perceived as a barrier by the management 
group (see Table 7). Collectively, the management group 
perceived that organizational ineffectiveness exists in 
"having managers and workers who can work productively 
together within an environment that is ambiguous and in 
flux" (Jones & Bearley, 1986, p. 5). 
All survey categories in the supports for 
organizational readiness responses showed statistically 
significant differences in how the management group and 
Board members perceived organizational ability to manage 
change effectively. Board members were far more 
optimistic in their belief that the organization is ready 
to move satisfactorily into a new management paradigm. 
Analysis of variance, as seen in Table 8, shows 
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Table 6 
Mean Ratings for Subjects' Reports on specific statements 
Concerning Behavioral Responses to Change situations 
Survey Item Management Group Board Members 
M SD M SD df 
Get involved 
in change 2.52 1. 37 3.86 1.68 (1,26) 4.49* 
Hide 
opposition 2.76 1.51 1.42 .54 (1,26) 5.11* 
What's in 




Mean Rating for Subjects' Reports on Perceived Barriers to 
















Mean Ratings of Subjects' Reports on Perceived Supports 















* 12. <.01, ** 12. <.001 
Board Members 
M SD df 
14.00 3.54 (1,29) 16.96** 
3.89 1. 36 (1,29) 13.43** 
11.11 4.54 (1,29) 11. 82* 
9.89 4.34 (1,29) 9.58* 
8.11 2.32 (1,29) 27.58** 
62 
statistical significance in how Board members responded to 
the following: structural, Technical, Climatic, People, 
and Systemic Readiness. 
According to Jones and Bearley (1986), an 
organization's structural readiness is determined by its 
ability "to keep a clear vision and to reorganize quickly 
and easily in response to external change and 
opportunity." Technological readiness refers to "the 
ability to remain current and innovative in the 
exploitation of material resources and know how." Climatic 
readiness means "having an internal ambience that supports 
people and planned-change efforts," and systemic readiness 
indicates that an organization has "systems in place that 
scan and provide information necessary to monitor effects 
of change" (p.5). Figures 1 and 2 provide a graphic 
representation of the OCRS aggregate scores for both the 
management and the Board groups. Depending on one's place 
within the hierarchy of the organization, very different 
perceptions were possible. Figure 3 shows the pattern of 
all subjects' composite scores on the OCOS. Although the 
pattern looks almost multidirectional, there is a slight 
inclination toward a Board and management combined, 
nonfunctional reaction to change (Jones & Bearley, 1986) 
Prior access to information about Total Quality 
Management had no significant relationship to perception 
about the organization's readiness for change. The 
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Figure 1. Force Field of the Board Member Group Mean Scores 
on the Organization Change Readiness Scale. 
lamers (Restraining Force.) 
21 0 19 13 17 
14 4 12 a 12 
'8 
J J .li! I t 1 ! I. J (J 7 2 6 4 6 i 
2.5 .7 4.3 2.8 3.5 
~ ", --r--
---
~--.::- ~------- ----- ------1-------- ~--.-- --- - - ----- -----------
/ 
-~07 ,o/' ,o/,·~ ~o/ 
~ /o~ ~o~ /o~ -.70~ 
--~ i""" r----Joo""'" -2 6 4 6 
I 6.7 ) 1.4 I 4.7 1 2.8 I 4.5 f I: (J 
14 J 4 12 e 12 
21 6 19 13 17 






Figure 2. Force Field of the Manager Group Mean Scores on 




Figure 3. Board Member and Management Group Mean Scores 
as Plotted from the Organization Change Orientation Scale. 
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graphic and statistical results of the quantitative 
analysis component of the study in combination with the 
hospital's Mission statement, in which are found explicit 
purpose, vision, and values, granted a way in which to 
address organizational supports for and barriers to the 
adoption of Total Quality Management with Department 
Managers and with selected representatives of the Board of 
Governors. In essence, the Mission statement, periodical, 
and outcome of the survey process had laid common ground 
upon which to begin the interview process. Pertinent 
interview questions for Department Managers were based on 
the graphic configuration of their survey scores and those 
of Board members. While the management group had 
identified few barriers to change, neither had they 
identified many supports. Their collective perception of 
the organization was one of status quo, that is, the 
opposing forces, facilitators and inhibitors to change 
were equal. 
Phase Two: Artifacts Findings 
Two sources of artifacts were used to identify 
explicit organizational values, The Public Hospital's 
Mission statement and a marketing publication, The 
[Public] Hospital: committed to the Community's continuing 
Care Needs. A shorter version of the four-page hospital 
Mission statement was rewritten in the winter of 1992 as a 
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collective effort between the Board of Governors and the 
Executive Director. To assist the leadership, written 
suggestions for input into the revision procedure were 
solicited from general staff. However, no additional 
opportunities for clarification of vision, values, or 
purpose were sought. The final product was mounted and 
displayed throughout the facility. Making the Mission 
statement public at the local level of the organization 
was thus accomplished with neither introduction nor an 
opportunity for information sharing between organizational 
levels concerning its full meaning. 
Four core values are identified within the document--
commitment to customer satisfaction, continuous 
improvement, partnership, and mutual respect. These 
stated values comply with those of a quality-focused 
organization (Deming, 1986; Juran, 1989). 
Advancement of the mission, vision, and values was 
made to staff, patients and the community at large through 
the publication of a periodical (May 1992) intended for 
general marketing purposes. within the context of this 
publication, the then-Chairman of the Board of Governors 
was asked, "On a day-to-day basis, what key resources does 
The [Public] Hospital depend on?" He is quoted as having 
replied, 
The [Public] Hospital's most valued resource is 
its people. Our Medical staff, our employees, 
our auxilians, and our volunteers are, together 
responsible for the special kind of care this 
facility provides. The [Public] Hospital is much 
more than bricks and mortar. It's a place of care. 
It's a place of hope. 
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To honor a commitment to anonymity, a copy of the May 
1992 periodical, The [Public] Hospital: committed to the 
Community's Continuing Care Needs, can be obtained through 
the researcher. 
Hospital-wide acceptance of the stated purpose, 
vision, and values contained within the Mission statement 
as well as within other public documents would be 
indicative of Deming's (1986) ideal of constancy of 
purpose and with Senge's (1990) belief in the necessity of 
shared vision and mission as fundamental requirements for 
organizational effectiveness. Essentially, the documented 
statement of purpose serves as an explicit promise to 
patients, staff, and community that the mission, vision, 
and values contained therein will be upheld by The Public 
Hospital. The expectation within a quality-focused 
organization goes even further. In such an organization 
the values are visibly and behaviorally demonstrated on a 
day-to-day basis in every action and interaction (Clemmer, 
1992; Juran, 1989; Senge, 1990; Whitely, 1991). 
Phase Three: Qualitative Findings 
Inquiry was undertaken to examine five thematic 
concepts associated with organizational effectiveness: 
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shared vision and mission, organizational learning, 
empowerment, reward and recognition, and leadership and 
behavioral norms (Deming, 1986; Juran, 1989; Kilmann, 
1989; Senge, 1990). These themes were also reflective of 
the categories addressed by Jones and Bearley (1986) 
within the Organizational Change Readiness Survey. 
Questions were loosely structured to enable wide latitude 
for respondents to express their views. Length of service 
for the Department Management group ranged from nine 
months to 35 years. For interviewed Board members, length 
of volunteerism on the hospital Board extended from six to 
20 years. 
During the interviews, there was shared agreement by 
both Department Managers and Board members that "Patient 
care is our constancy of purpose." Many respondents noted 
with pride that, "We are The Public. We give excellent 
care!" However, a common motif woven into Department 
Managers' responses about constancy of purpose also 
indicated a gap between that which was stated and that 
which they saw behaviorally manifested by the senior 
management team. Such incongruity is in opposition to a 
single-mindedness toward excellence in patient care. 
Although The Public's stated core values specific to 
quality patient care and staff respect were deeply held by 
Department Managers, they expressed doubt that the same 
depth of commitment existed at the level of the CEO and 
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senior management team. Image and finance, as opposed to 
quality of worklife and excellence in patient care, were 
often cited by department managers as the drivers for 
decision-making by the senior management team. 
What really matters is how good we look in the 
community, how well we get along with the Board 
and whether the Board thinks we're doing a wonderful 
job. 
Even though they give lip service to oh, yes, we 
must be wonderful for patient care, unconsciously 
he (CEO) really doesn't care about the staff or the 
patients .•• I see the Mission statement as lip 
service. 
The system doesn't expect excellence, doesn't know 
what excellence is nor does it have a desire to find 
out. 
[Our constancy of purpose] ••. not to go into a deficit 
position although our Mission statement says 
otherwise. 
The idea of lip service about commitment to people 
and to excellence in patient care, distrust and decaying 
morale became a common refrain throughout the Department 
Managers' interviews. Many managers expressed their 
conviction that the motivation for talking commitment to 
excellence resides in the desire to present well to the 
Board and to the community. Basically, Department 
Managers asserted a commonplace conviction that 
incongruity was evident between the explicit Mission 
statement and its implicit interpretation. 
All is cloaked behind a veil of doing the right 
thing, great facility. These are platitudes; 
senior management is in denial. 
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The difficulty I have is between what's said and 
what's done. What's presented as who we are and 
what we're doing and where we're going is one thing, 
but when it actually comes down to that being done, 
to me anyway, there seems to be a rift there for 
saying one thing and doing another. 
We keep hearing a bunch of words without meaning. 
People are disillusioned. 
Finances are the only bottom-line issue. Where you 
would normally think that, O.K., financial concerns 
are very real, they have to be tempered with honest 
concern for the people. But, it's not. It 
[financial concern] becomes the major focus or is the 
major focus, although again, there's some lip service 
given to people. 
[Our] influence upward depends on the issue. If it's 
financial in nature, it gets a response. The people 
issues, the touchy-feely stuff gets a cold shoulder. 
There's attempts made at certain times but there's no 
constancy. Even the staff perceive that staying in 
the black is the bottom line. They know they're 
second. Well third actually, first it's the money, 
then the patients, then the staff. 
Arising from shared vision, mission, and values, a 
clear organizational direction is tantamount to successful 
change efforts (Deming, 1986; Juran, 1989; Senge, 1990). 
Everyone in the organization should be aware of the 
planned strategic initiatives that support organizational 
goals, both short- and long-term. When interviewed about 
the Public Hospital's future direction, respondents at 
both departmental and Board levels shared a sense of 
confusion. From the Board members' perspective, lack of 
clear direction was in part accounted for by the 
indecisiveness of the Ministry of Health. Board member 
responses included, 
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I don't think we have a vlslon. 
to where the Ministry of Health 
to establish a vision. Patient 
direction. 
We're uncertain as 
is going so it's hard 
care is our 
We just spent one hundred and fifty thousand dollars 
on consultants to help us plan an expansion, to build 
a day hospital, to be a leader in gerontology. All 
that is dead in the water. The fact that we don't 
know where we're going in Long Term Care is causing 
despondency at the Board level. 
Where's the report from the Ministry [of Health] on 
the redirection of Long Term Care? We've had three 
of them, one from the last three governments and none 
of them is definitive. 
Every time we made that step as a Board to do 
something, we were shot dead in the water. 
My opinion is that chronic care hospitals will be 
shunted from the Ministry of Health to the Ministry 
of Community and Social Services. 
other Board members where less specific in their 
responses about the establishment of direction. 
I don't care what I accomplish. I just want to be in 
as good shape as I can be .... We need to take what 
we've got and try to run with it. We need to blow 
our own horn more. 
Lack of clear direction at the Board level is echoed 
throughout the Department Managers' own sense of confusion 
about the hospital's future. 
There isn't any direction, or maybe it's so diverse 
that we have no clear focal point to pursue. 
The goals and vision are unclear ... if we're 
changing, we're changing at random. 
Our role has been fluctuating. One day I'm on 
this track of early discharge into the community 
--more out of hospital care. The next day, we're 
concentrating on more maintenance and prevention. 
O.K., this means more slow paced rehabilitation. 
I don't want to be unrealistic [about early 
discharge] if the rest of the team is thinking 
maintenance. 
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I went around saying, "Are we expanding the hospital? 
What are we doing?" Did I get a straight or 
consistent answer from anyone? No. It was always 
varied. There is no definite story between each 
person. Do we know what we're doing? 
One department manager did report a belief in a 
definitive direction but could not elaborate, 
I think it's held by the senior level. 
that's the way it's got to be for now. 
it will go down and reach other areas. 
I think 
In time 
When asked how The Public Hospital could maintain its 
competitive position to remain viable in the future, one 
Board member answered, "We're lost at it. I believe that 
if we gotta go, we're going to go." Department managers 
held similar convictions about the hospital's 
organizational capability to remain viable in a changing 
health care climate. 
I get some information but it doesn't include 
what the direction is. I think we're in a very 
precarious position right now. It's a very crucial 
time for us and Long Term Care ... it's make it or 
break it time. 
I see chronic care as more complex patient care. 
That frightens me because I don't think we're ready 
to handle a more complex patient population. We 
lack the professional skills and competencies. 
The demand is out there and I think we have to move. 
If we don't move, I think the hospital will lose it's 
funding. 
The idea of competencies and skills at the 
front-line, in senior management, as well as within 
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themselves was often cited as a real concern for 
Department Managers. 
I honestly think that among the [department] managers 
the fear is not necessarily with themselves. They 
are very interested in being progressive. The fear 
is at the top. There are a few in senior management 
who I believe do not possess the competencies to lead 
the organization into the future. 
There are pockets, fragments of knowledge in senior 
management but their biggest tendency is to wait and 
see. We're reactive rather than proactive. 
I don't necessarily think that the organization 
values learning. I get the feeling that they 
[senior management] want us to do all this but 
they don't want to pay for it. They don't want 
to give us the time, the money, whatever it is for 
us to move in a particular direction. 
They want the image, and they want us to do a good 
job, but, somehow they think we can learn by osmosis. 
There are expectations of their people without 
investment in them. 
The education budget has been slashed. The book 
budget has been slashed so if you're not able to 
order books to find out what changes are going on 
in your field and you're not allowed enough money 
to attend conventions and things, I'd like to know 
how we're supposed to be informed. 
We are so stretched to the limit. I would like to 
be out there learning all the time but there isn't 
the support system behind [us] to learn, to change. 
I find for [the front-line] it's very frustrating . 
... we would like to have someone with us to help us 
develop our skills so that we can provide care to a 
more complex patient ... there's a barrier because 
there isn't the funding. 
We're told that the hospital supports education, 
training, that people are seen as the most important 
resource. But in action I'd say no, this isn't 
happening. It's given lip service ... it's fine for 
me to show interest in taking a course but you're 
only really given approval to take the course if you 
can find funding from some place else. So how much 
true support for learning is that showing? 
I don't think at The [Public] Hospital you are 
encouraged as far as getting ahead in your career. 
From the Board members' perspective, the hospital's 
past focus was to make money. 
Our hospital was run to make money. We were very 
parsimonious. We didn't buy anything ..• we're one 
of the last ones to get a computer. 
Being so concerned with money meant that our 
administrative systems in the actual day to day 
running were less efficient •.• we just got our 
Human Resources person 2 years ago. We have the 
same number of staff but this person was never 
thought of before •... Well, in today's age, you 
have to have these people and computers. 
Bearing in mind that the Department Managers as a 
group believe that the primary concern for the senior 
management team is financial solvency as opposed to 
quality of patient care or of worklife, there was 
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considerable frustration expressed over the allocation of 
the hospital's resources. If resources were not being 
invested in knowledge and skills development of those who 
produce care, the organization strategic advantage, what 
were the Department Managers' notions about resource 
allocation? 
Whenever I have asked for new equipment I have to 
prove I really need it. I have to go through several 
studies, statistics and so on. 
I have to fight for whatever resources I need for 
the department and yet it seems to me in other areas 
of the hospital where somebody [an AED] wanted new 
wallpaper or carpets or a desk because they weren't 
going to move into that area until things were done, 
no problem. 
I have no idea. Sometimes it depends on who you 
know. 
The basis for decision-making is cost and patients. 
Whatever we do, we must have the resources. 
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Finance is perceived as always getting everything, 
and they do--brand new desks, oak desks, more staff. 
There are the have and the have not departments. 
Some of the have departments like the lab generate 
income. Any department that generates income of any 
kind, gets. Anyone who doesn't, if they just have 
patient interaction, well that doesn't count. 
Finance Department appears to have a lot of staff. 
If patient care is our primary fOCUS, why do we seem 
to have a larger ratio of staff in Finance? 
There's a sense of frustration that departments can't 
get the resources necessary to do their jobs. This 
seems to be more in the non-patient care areas. It's 
harder for the higher ups to understand how educating 
or helping employees impacts on patient care. 
The dissatisfaction surrounding resource allocation 
spilled over into decision-making in general. As the 
interview process continued, it became evident that the 
traditional structures that supported decision-making at 
the hospital were an additional source of disgruntlement. 
The most significant issues for Department Managers rested 
with their conviction that they were not meaningfully 
included in the decisional processes. Decision-making 
seemed disjointed, and once decisions were made, 
Department Managers believed that there was no expectation 
of follow-through. In contrast to the stated values of 
continuous improvement and partnership, very often 
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respondents spoke about being blocked or in some way 
thwarted in carrying out plans that they saw as important 
for their area of responsibility. 
We don't trust the people at the top to make the 
right decisions because of the finance focus and 
the short-term thinking. 
If decisions are made. That's what's so frustrating 
at times, that decisions aren't made. It's like why 
bother because nobody's going to say yes or no. Why 
beat my head against a wall? 
There is a fear of hearing no. Then all of this 
[change to TQM] will go nowhere. You just get so 
frustrated that you give up. 
[Decisions] are made at the department management 
level as far as we can go and then we try to push 
them through committees •.. to upper management and 
the CEO. We get stonewalled a majority of the 
time •.• Problems don't get solved at all. We just 
have to muddle through. 
When I was reporting to the CEO, there was never 
enough information supplied to him. NOw, I have 
another report, the AED. It's just another level to 
try to get through. 
You try and improve but, it gets to a certain 
point where it needs approval and it's blocked off. 
It just takes so long to get anything done. 
Things get lost, they get shoved aside on the 
agenda, put aside. You keep asking, "Has this been 
approved? Can we proceed with these changes?" We 
get nowhere. 
Even when we come forward with a minor idea, 
there's no cost, no jeopardy, but, it's different--we 
can't get it through. If cost is involved, forget 
it. It seems we're half a step behind and always 
incomplete. 
We hire consultants who make recommendations then, 
the Department Manager has to do everything again to 
prove that the consultant's recommendations are 
valid. Nothing ever gets implemented. We just keep 
jumping through the same hoops. 
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There are a lot of unimportant questions asked by the 
CEO. He tends to knit-pick, to stall meetings. He 
comes unprepared so we have to start allover again 
at the beginning. 
He drags things out ... he doesn't understand what 
the process is ... he goes on and on about it 
... he changed my wording on something insignificant. 
His wording meant the same thing but I had to change 
it anyway. I had to come back with the thing all 
redone. We lost three more months. 
Department Managers' frustration with their inability 
to effect change through influence at the senior level was 
echoed in their conviction that the Board of Governors was 
delinquent in fulfilling its role of leadership at the 
hospital. 
Our greatest barriers are ignorance and wanting 
to maintain the status quo and the mind-set of a 
volunteer Board who thinks they're here to do lunch. 
When the Department Managers were shown the graphic 
configuration of the Board of Governor's composite 
response to the OCRS, the most commonly held assumptions 
for the differences in perception between the management 
group and Board members were, 
I find it hard to see how they [the Board] 
could come up with this perception except that 
they have no contact with us. They have contact 
with upper management and it's important that 
everything look good. 
They're [the Board] being fed information they want 
to hear. 
It has to do with the knowledge they [the Board] 
possess. They [the Board] don't work here. 
They're not in the system. 
To the Board, everything looks good. They're just 
seeing the surface. 
They [the Board] may be from the community but they 
don't represent the people. They're pillars of the 
community but without understanding of ordinary 
people. 
Board members responses to the same comparison 
confirmed much of what the Department Managers suspected 
concerning the Board's emphasis on excellence in patient 
care, "There is an immense pride in the Board in the way 
patients are cared for." However, the Department 
Managers' expectation concerning the administrative role 
of the Board was in conflict, 
Hospital Boards are volunteer Boards. We don't get 
involved in management; we're here to govern. I 
firmly believe that it's administration's 
responsibility to manage; it's the Board's 
responsibility to govern. 
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We don't really get involved in the internal politics 
of the hospital. 
Diminished faith in the comprehensiveness and 
pertinence of the information presented to the hospital 
Board may have been confirmed in part by the interviews 
with the Board members, 
We don't have anyone on the Board who can deal with 
the Medical side of things. We pretty much let 
Dr. X tell us about pharmacy committee and things 
like that. We get more talk about the plant 
facility ... it's accepted that all the patients are 
happy ... it's a given because this is The [Public] 
Hospital. 
A few Department Managers had raised the possibility 
of staff representation on the Board of Governors. They 
reasoned that non-voting status would provide an 
opportunity for improved communication between the front-
line and the Board and could serve as a resource for 
enhanced information. During the course of Board member 
interviews, this concept was raised for their 
consideration with the following comment, 
There is a reluctance from administration and some 
Board members to put staff representatives on the 
Board .•• it comes out of a conflict of interest 
business ethic ... I don't think there's that trust 
there. 
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Those interviewed at the Board level tended to share 
the observations of the Department Management group in 
that differences in perception were most likely accounted 
for by the depth of involvement in day-to-day operational 
affairs. 
I think the difference is dealing everyday, as 
you guys do, with the problems in the health care 
sector .•. and what the Board is still doing in a 
philosophical way. 
An exploration of communication patterns between 
organizational levels and among Department Managers 
revealed the existence of stringent barriers to 
communication and poorly established information channels. 
Department Managers believed that the senior management 
team communicates and informs based on need to know. Poor 
communication, a lack of information, and a belief that 
those in authority at the senior management level had 
little appreciation or understanding of subordinate jobs 
or needs resulted in lost morale and fragmentation. 
I've been assigned an AED who has absolutely no 
idea of what I do or how the department interacts. 
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We don't get information we need and I think a lot 
of stuff is being withheld ... I don't really know the 
reason except they think ignorance is bliss. 
There is a lack or understanding about what my 
job actually entails and what my job is all about. 
I suspect somebody knew something that they weren't 
saying. 
We're told what to do. One, two, three, that's 
all there is. 
We have fuzzy jobs with no clear definition or 
expectations. 
We need to work between the levels because if 
there was no problem in levels, there would be no 
problem between departments. 
They [senior management] could be a lot closer 
to us than they are. They could share a lot more 
information than they do ... I don't understand why 
they are afraid to do that, or why they think it's 
necessary not to. 
We're sort of segmented in that we all have different 
AEDs ... we're not allowed to congregate and discuss 
things as a group. The CEO was approached about that 
and he absolutely forbade it. 
It would be nice to meet with the AEDs and Department 
Heads and have a real open discussion, but, that's 
not how it happens. 
People don't get informed ... communication can also 
be used as a tool for power, withholding information. 
I know something you don't know therefore, I'm one up 
on you. 
Groups form between and within levels. Interactions 
are limited with certain people ... everyone is 
protecting himself. It's very territorial. 
There is a lot of secretiveness, a lot of this 
between you and me stuff going on. 
Interpersonal conflict is not limited to departments 
and levels. Serious discord was also reported among the 
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members of the multidisciplinary team's clinical peer 
group. Central to major disagreement is the introduction 
of untested ideas concerning patient care. In an 
established clinical decision pattern the introduction of 
innovative interventions may bring with it a feeling of 
personal alienation. 
Even though when you explain it and you can 
visibly and verbally demonstrate how it could be 
better for the patient, it is still resisted. 
I see barriers to change •.. attitudinal ••. I think 
I have never encountered such resistance to change • 
•.. they say, yah, yah, but when so and so was here, 
they always did it this way. 
This is not a place I find excelling in humaness. 
Several Department Managers identified coffee breaks 
as the only true Public Hospital ritual. 
Between 10:00 and 10:30 you can't find anyone 
around here, even if this place is on fire! There's 
a certain group and they're gone for half an hour. 
I've picked up cliques and what I have learned from 
that is, maybe I don't take enough coffee 
breaks to really socialize with people and get to 
know them and they can't get to know me. 
People meet at coffee .•. I think it would be a 
problem for those who didn't interact that way. 
The coffee break as a social construct also 
underscored a perception of barriers between the clinical 
and non-clinical departments. 
My perception is that there are the non-patient 
care departments and the patient care departments, 
and there doesn't seem to be a lot of understanding. 
People go to coffee with different groups ..• patient 
services group, they do their own thing ... and nobody 
says how are things going or anything like that. 
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We communicate when we have to do something to 
arrange things, but, the non-patient group can 
arrange their coffee break, can arrange their own 
lunchtime. They've got very much control over their 
day because the patients aren't sitting there waiting 
for them. 
A fundamental source from which to evaluate 
social relationships and the effectiveness of 
communication is the monthly Department Head meeting. 
In reality the Department Head meetings seem to be 
satisfying the communication needs of only one half of the 
management equation, the senior management team. 
I don't like the way they're called, 10 minutes 
in advance ... I don't learn a hell of a lot from 
them. 
We have department head meetings and we're 
talked down to, and he [CEO] gets frustrated 
with us because we don't ask questions, but 
when we do, we're jumped on ... we're made to feel 
that the questions are inappropriate. They may 
be but, it's because we're uninformed. 
I've spoken up [at Department Heads' meetings], 
both on my own and in support of what somebody else 
was saying, which may be a little controversial ... we 
were just trounced on! 
I prefer not to go ... you can't talk about anything 
seriously ... 
If you're asked for your opinion and you give it, or 
if you're asked if there's a question, you're told 
that's the way it is. Next time you're in that 
situation, you don't ask any questions. 
You can't speak your mind especially in front of 
others at department head meetings. He'll [CEO] 
try to make you look foolish if he doesn't like 
what he's hearing. 
He [CEO] gives us two messages, tell me and don't 
tell me ... it's tell me but only what I want to hear. 
Z tried to tell him the truth but he [CEO] lost his 
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temper. 
All you have to do is be at one of the department 
head meetings to feel the tension. Like everyone 
would just like to scream but you can't say anything. 
Especially when he [CEO] says "Are there any 
questions?", and you know the minute you open your 
mouth you're going to get slammed. So, of course 
everyone just sits there and looks at each other 
while thinking lots of things we could never dare to 
say. 
Department head meetings are good to the extent that 
they are one-sided. We're being told what happen~d 
at the Board meeting. Other than that seldom does a 
department head talk about problems if there has been 
a problem. 
Very tense, very tense, a lot of tension and fear 
if people say something, they'll be challenged in 
front of their peers. There is a real reluctance to 
speak out. 
The effects of management by control, top down 
directives, and the suppression of workers' desire for 
self-expression for the purpose of learning and 
exploration are communicated very well in the following 
experience of one Department Manager. 
It's really funny to me ••. outside this organization 
I am a functioning adult; I have autonomy. I look 
after my mortgage payments, I support myself and my 
family. I don't think I do a bad job. In here, 
that's removed. I am no longer allowed to have any 
decision-making authority. I am told what the 
parameters are [in] which I am to perform my job, and 
they will not accept any new ideas. They want to 
maintain status quo. I'm treated like a 
four-year-old. I just can't believe how they expect 
people to function. 
It is within the context of the department head 
meetings that behavioral norms, the implicit and unspoken 
rules of the organization, are most plainly visible. When 
asked individually to articulate The Public Hospital's 
behavioral norms, Department Managers shared without 
exception the following, 
Keep the Board happy. 
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Please the boss, tell him only what he wants to hear. 
Don't upset him, egg-walk. 
Always support him, no matter what his ideas are. 
Don't break the rules but the rules are a moving 
target. 
Don't rock the boat. 
Don't speak up. 
Don't be honest. 
Don't tell the truth. 
Don't ask any questions. 
Don't give your opinion. 
stay in your place. 
Mind your own business. 
Don't try anything new. 
Don't be innovative. 
Don't risk. 
Don't make a mistake 
Keep within budget. 
You can show initiative if it doesn't cost money. 
If you can't see an end point and it's going to 
cost money, then don't bother. 
Do a good job without complaining. 
Do a good job ... perfection. 
A good day's work for a good day's pay. 
Don't expect too many thank YOUSe 
Perhaps the most revealing comment was, "don't reveal 
the behavioral norms." Frequently expressed was a need 
for reassurance about confidentiality, and that, within 
the final text, no one would be able to recognize the 
owner of the comments. Often, Department Managers 
apologized for their comments, stating how difficult it 
was for them to be revealing deeply guarded secrets. 
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other respondents showed open anger toward their working 
conditions, readily offering perceptions about their 
personal experiences and those they had witnessed. 
Department Managers, too, expressed the notion that their 
own style of management was more constructive than that 
with which they were expected to cope. 
Most department managers are professionals. They 
know the job others are doing and have respect for 
the frontline. Most [department] managers have come 
from the front-line so they know what it's like. 
That's the reason we try to buffer the conditions 
between the top and the lower part. 
There are two sets of rules, those for working up 
and those for working down. Department heads try 
to work with their staff, to value them as people. 
I think we're more functional. 
others used the analogy of a family to describe their 
way of coping with the experience of their work 
environment. The idea of members of an organization 
interacting in much the same way as a family worked well 
during the interview process because Department Managers 
and Board members frequently used the term family to 
describe the hospital. 
If the mother's role is to nurture, listen, 
console, we find our mother among our peers. 
The children go underground. They don't like 
the rules set from above, so they make their own 
to deal with their own staff. 
There are dysfunctional families and dysfunctional 
organizations. 
The family is in trouble ... There's a certain amount 
of health ••. people who are supportive, people to 
-confide in ... I would relate it to children within a 
dysfunctional family who band together to support 
each other ... there's a fear of speaking out. You 
cannot be totally honest. 
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Repeatedly Department Managers identified the CEO as 
the authoritarian father figure, the rule maker, and three 
of the four AEDs as nurturing peace-making mother figures. 
Most often, the mothering was viewed as passive, peace at 
any price--disabling rather than enabling. Many 
Department Managers expressed doubt in the quality of the 
interaction or the truthfulness with which the AEDs 
approached the CEO. 
[The CEO] wants to keep rose colored glasses on 
for the Board. This makes me unsure as to how 
truthful the AEDs are with him. 
When one considers the Department Managers' sense of 
frustration with the leadership shown by the Board, the 
lack of confidence in the guidance and direction coming 
from senior management, and the barriers to effective 
communication and information channels, one could begin to 
understand the significance that autonomy over their 
functional area held for the Department Managers. One 
Department Manager described the fear of breeching the 
implicit rule, "tell them only what they want to hear," as 
follows, 
We package information. Sometimes we don't give 
it to them ... I might loose whatever autonomy I 
have to run my department ... lf I keep them [senior 
management] ill-informed they don't have to deal 
with the reality that might force change, and I 
get to play in my own private picnic ground ... it's 
a payback. 
Independence in your department .•. it lets us exist. 
other sources of fear in the organization centered 
around job security in a tight economic environment, 
making the wrong decision and, generally, change. In an 
environment where such rigid, oppressive norms operate, 
Department Managers believed that taking a risk could 
jeopardize their positions. 
Anybody who is a risk taker is dangerous because 
then they will upset the status quo ... you may even 
be penalized for suggesting a new idea. 
You're juggling all these balls and you're going 
to drop one ... that's what I fear I think ... it's 
screwing up someplace where you should have been 
doing this and this and this. 
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On a feeling of pride in one's work, those Department 
Managers having direct contact with patients seemed to 
experience greater satisfaction from their work than did 
those non-patient Department Managers. From a patient 
care area, 
People take pride in working here. They get 
positive reactions from the patients ... When the 
patients make positive comments, it makes you feel 
good. 
For the non-patient care areas, Department Managers 
were less certain about how they were performing. 
Although some organizational barometers are in place among 
peer groups, between levels a meaningful system for reward 
or recognition does not exist. 
I get recognition from other department heads 
occasionally; but, no, no, nothing from the senior 
team. What happens in here is if you do a good 
job, nobody says anything; if you screw up, they 
let you know. 
I get the feeling from senior management, just do a 
good job, don't complain, just do it and shut up ... 
Our work is appreciated, but we're not. 
Nobody said to me that I was off track so, as far 
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as I'm concerned, I must be in the right direction ... 
If you have nothing that's reacting to you then you 
must be in the right mode. 
Instead of praise or anything, he [CEO] is into 
questioning what my professional role is and how much 
they [my profession] charge and how they're ripping 
the public off. I find myself defending my 
profession. 
You do the homework, they'll make changes, even 
though they're insignificant and then their name goes 
on it. Then I look like I'm still below them, I'm 
made to stay in my place. 
It's almost shocking to senior management that the 
staff need consideration. For some in senior 
management, it's not intentional but, for others I 
believe it is. Lack of commitment to staff keeps a 
distance, a way of maintaining control. 
An important finding is the recurrent theme that not 
all senior managers are viewed as obstacles to 
organizational effectiveness. Consistent over all 
Department Manager's remarks was the tempering of senior 
management criticism with the phrases, "not all", "just a 
few", "some." On closer questioning, a shared perception 
was established--the senior management team, in their 
managerial values and beliefs, is polarized. Half (three) 
are seen as controlling, authoritarian, distrustful of 
others, and ineffective. The other three are perceived as 
more moderate, progressive, better listeners and, in some 
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cases, mentors to their subordinates. The researcher, in 
working with the senior management team as their TQM 
coach, has made the same observation. However, senior 
managers within the more collegial pole were also 
perceived by subordinates as possessing limited influence 
with the CEO. Those organizational values behaviorally 
demonstrated by the CEO were those perceived by Department 
Managers as most prescriptive within the institution. 
One final finding, which will require further study, 
is the belief among the Department Management Group that 
gender bias exists at the level of the senior management 
team. Gender bias was raised as an organizational 
characteristic by several (66.7%) Department Managers; 
three of five male Department Managers and nine of 13 
females. In particular, the three senior managers whose 
style is more authoritarian are the same three implicated 
as holding a bias toward women in the workplace. 
The CEO probably doesn't trust anyone, but [he 
trusts] men moreso than women. 
The CEO deals better with males. [He] is adamant 
that we use the word chairman, even though all 
around us people are using the word chairperson. 
To me, it says a lot about a man that gets upset 
about a word •.. it does matter to females and how 
life is changing outside The [Public]. 
I would say with one AED gender is an issue. 
He doesn't work well with women, likes to 
be controlling, play the boss. 
Because Y is a male, there seems to be an awful 
lot that's done ... It's an obvious relationship 
that because he's a man. 
Just look at the senior management team; it's an 
old boys club. 
Indeed, the senior management team is comprised 
entirely of males. The role of AED, Patient Care has 
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traditionally been occupied by a woman, generally because 
the position tends to be held by nurses and the majority 
of nurses are female. However, when the position was 
filled, approximately 18 months ago, the successful 
applicant was male. Because the CEO personally 
interviewed and selected the new AED, he may have 
contributed to the perception that he holds a gender bias. 
This remains an interesting finding for health care 
in general, as most hospitals and other health care 
institutions are staffed chiefly by women in care-giving 
roles, in housekeeping, dietary services, etc. Whether 
workers or managers within organizations, women's voices 
need to be heard. The concepts of teamwork, shared 
vision, values, partnership, respect, organizational 
learning, lean toward the feminine traits of nurturing and 
empowerment, those traits most prized by new management 
theorists ( Deming, 1986; Juran, 1989; Senge, 1990), and 
certainly by the Department Management group at The Public 
Hospital. 
Phase Four: Group Discussion Findings 
The following organizational factors were generated 
92 
from the Department Managers during the debriefing of the 
recognized barriers to the adoption of a TQM paradigm at 
The Public Hospital. 
Top down management style and lack of communication. 
caste system ... all the decisional power is at the 
top. 
The bottom-line mindset. 
Lack of senior level commitment and dedication to 
change. 
Lack of respect for senior management leadership. 
Gutlessness ... Fear of risk. 
Time constraints. 
Change is too slow therefore, trust is lost during 
the process. 
Lack of skills and knowledge upon which to build 
changes. 
Resistance and anticipated sabotage. 
Lack of trust. 
Burnout. 
After group discussion and team building exercises, 
the Department Management group did disclose their 
frustrations collectively and publicly. within the 
context of this exercise, many questions were openly 
raised about future direction. Peers shared concerns and 
fears. Two senior managers, the AED Human Resources and 
the AED Hospital and Paramedical Services were sought and 
invited to join the discussion. They arrived immediately, 
and the Department Management group continued to air 
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concerns and to ask questions. The behavioral norm around 
the suppression of speech had been successfully 
challenged, and barriers to change, that is, opportunities 
requiring attention for improvement identified. 
CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY AND INTERPRETATION 
OF THE FINDINGS 
The purpose of the research was to identify the 
fundamental leadership values and behavioral norms that 
shape the corporate culture of The Public Hospital for the 
purpose of determining the organization's readiness to 
change to a TQM paradigm. The study findings indicated 
that collectively, the organization's managers perceived 
the organization as status quo, while Board members tended 
toward a more positive corporate outlook. If this was so, 
what factors within the organizational culture were 
responsible for the discrepancy in perceptions: manager 
pessimism and Board optimism? What managerial performance 
deficiencies were accounting for the hospital's state of 
inertia? If the Mission statement proposed care in 
action, were senior managers, through their deeply held 
values and beliefs, in reality exhibiting care inaction? 
Five thematic concepts associated with organizational 
effectiveness were developed for the purpose of Department 
Manager interviews: shared vision and mission, 
organizational learning, empowerment, reward and 
recognition, and leadership and behavioral norms. 
Department Management and Board member perceptions and 
constructs contained within these themes were then 
integrated into Points #1,5,8,9, and 12 of Deming's (1986) 
14 points to establish benchmarks for cultural evaluation 
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under the new Total Quality Management paradigm as adopted 
by the Board of Governors of The Public Hospital. 
Deming's (1986) points are as follows: 
#1. Create constancy of purpose for the improvement 
of process and service 
#5. Find problems. It is management's job to work 
continually on improving the system. 
#8. Drive out fear so that everyone may work 
effectively for the company. 
#9. Break down barriers between departments. 
#12. Remove barriers that rob employees of their 
pride in workmanship. 
(Gitlow & Gitlow, 1987, p.20) 
Chronic organizational problems were identified 
within all of Deming's culturally relevant points. 
However, most chronic problems seemed to be arising from 
the absence of a shared constancy of purpose, communicated 
explicitly (in artifacts and structure) and implicitly (in 
behavioral norms) by the senior management team's values 
and beliefs. 
Fundamental Leadership Values 
The fundamental leadership values of The Public 
Hospital include an unbalanced commitment to financial 
strength and protection of the hospital's image, 
management by control, and maintenance of the hierarchial 
structure. As such, these values are in conflict with 
those espoused within the hospital's Mission statement--
customer satisfaction, continuous improvement, 
partnership, and mutual respect in all interactions. 
Deming (1986) Point #1 
create constancy of purpose for the improvement 
of process and service. 
(Shared purpose, vision, and values) 
Summary of Research Findings 
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1. Board members and Department Managers agreed that 
excellence in patient care is the constancy of purpose for 
The Public. In contrast, Department Managers 
overwhelmingly perceive that the constancy of purpose for 
the senior management team is financially entrenched. 
2. Each group reported confusion over the organization's 
future direction, custodial care or medical care. The 
confusion has arisen, in part, from lack of direction from 
the Ministry of Health concerning the redirection of Long 
Term Care within ontario, and consequently, due to lack of 
direction from the organization's leadership to the 
Department Managers and frontline. 
3. Present Board leaders report a move away from their 
traditional organizational goal, to make money, toward a 
greater concern for future viability through service 
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excellence and quality of patient care. Previous Boards 
placed their emphasis on the appearance of the physical 
plant and on the expansion of care giving capacity through 
additions to the building, and to the acquisition of 
patient beds. 
4. Board members reported higher confidence in 
organizational effectiveness and commitment to change than 
did Department Managers. However, until the Belicki 
(1992) study, the Board had not used evaluative criteria 
to gain a clear understanding of the quality of worklife 
and subsequently, patient life at The Public. There is a 
strong tendency to rely on image above measurable data. 
Extraneous to day-to-day operations, Board members have 
very little knowledge of or insight into corporate 
problems. 
5. The current Board Executive makes a strong 
distinction between the roles of management and Governance 
and thus have taken a laissez faire approach to the 
hospital's management issues. 
6. The present Board leadership reports an expansion of 
their own committee structure, thus involving a broader 
base of Board member participation within decisional 
processes. Regeneration of a community relations 
committee is thought to be a positive factor; those 
involved are energized by the prospect. These changes at 
the Board level, indicative of a Board attempt at renewal, 
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may be responsible for a stronger sense of commitment to a 
change in The Public Hospital's management strategy. 
Because the Board holds the decisional authority to adopt 
TQM, members would be more likely to show commitment 
through involvement and expression of their opinions about 
change. In contrast, Department Managers with no 
involvement in change decisions, less perceived authority 
over actual change implementation, and who must cope daily 
with organizational issues, tend to hide their opposition 
to change, preferring to place their energies into coping 
with the effects of change. This notiop is supported by 
the finding that management, collectively, showed less 
commitment to a quality improvement paradigm than did the 
Board of Governors. It would be unlikely that managers 
would welcome change if it is perceived by them to be 
outside of their realm of decisional control. 
7. One important accomplishment for this Board Executive 
was the revision and up-dating of the hospital mission 
statement to reflect corporate values in support of their 
mission, excellence in patient care. The fotir explicit 
core .. values are customer satisfaction, continuous 
improvement, partnership, and mutual respect in all 
interactions. 
8. Among Department Managers there is a perceived 
incongruity between what The Public Hospital's Mission 
statement professes to value and that which is experienced 
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as a result of senior managers' behaviors. 
Interpretation 
At the Board and Department Management levels there is 
a common mission, excellence in patient care. The 
purpose, however, is confused by whether the hospital's 
role should be one of custodial or medically scientific 
care. Belicki (1992) also found "that there is no 
consensus about the Mission of The [Public] Hospital, for 
example whether it is purely a rehabilitation hospital or 
whether it is an institution that aims to be both hospital 
and home" (p. 37). 
If the product of The Public Hospital as a business 
is patient care, then providing excellent care must be the 
rationale at the core of all decision-making. At the 
level of senior management decision-making, there is both 
evidence and perception that financial considerations 
outweigh patient care. The outcome is an organization in 
conflict on two distinct mission variables: patient care 
versus money, and custodial care versus medical care. 
without true constancy of purpose, shared vision 
cannot be articulated at either the Board or Department 
Management levels. without shared mission and vision, 
there exists no strategic path into the future. This has 
created confusion and loss of meaning throughout the 
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organization. The Board's response to loss of direction 
is to blame the Ministry of Health, and to attempt an 
effort at renewal through a change in strategic focus. 
However, the senior management team does not seem fully 
cognizant of the implications of the shift at the Board 
level. As such, they continue to operate out of a 
traditional finance paradigm, further confusing 
organizational direction. Corrective alignment between 
the revised Mission statement and its explicit values with 
corporate structures and processes is confounded. 
Furthermore, without Board willingness to engage in a more 
active leadership role, senior management is free to 
continue to exercise outdated, inappropriate management 
practices. Should the current state of Board laissez 
faire continue, there will be no communication structure 
by which to accurately inform the Board of organizational 
status or performance. For all good intentions at a 
renewed corporate initiative, the hospital will remain 
inert. 
Demoralized Department Managers blame the Board, the 
senior group, the economy and each other for their 
experience of the loss of meaning and uncertain direction. 
Security is sought from the external (Rotter, 1961 as 
cited in Hoyenga & Hoyenga, 1984); their confidence is 
deeply wounded. When members of an organization fail to 
share a truly common vision, a deeply unifying purpose, 
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conflict easily divides them. within such an environment, 
excellence in patient care is inachievable. 
Deming (1986) Point #5 
Find problems. It is management's job to work 
continually on improving the system. 
(Leadership and Behavioral Norms) 
Summary of Research Findings 
1. The leadership at The Public Hospital is polarized 
into two conflicting styles and sets of values. One pole 
is very authoritarian, the other more supportive and 
mentoring. The authoritarian pole administrates but has 
poorly developed managerial and leadership skills; the 
supportive pole has better management skills, yet they too 
are deficient in leadership. Slightly more than half the 
senior managers have received formal education in 
managerial competencies and leadership skills, but not 
recently. Although the Board has adopted an entirely 
different management strategy, only one senior manager has 
sought extramural education on the new paradigm. 
2. The leadership role of the Board of Governors is 
ambiguous. 
3. Top down rules are applied arbitrarily and 
inconsistently. Senior management has often been 
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perceived by subordinates as transgressors of their own 
established policies and rules. One particularly salient 
norm for senior management is, "with position comes 
privilege." 
4. Behavioral norms, leadership-specific and operative at 
the Department Management level as well as within the 
senior team are "Don't upset the boss," "Tell him what he 
wants to hear," and "Don't bring him a problem." 
5. Leadership attempts coming from other, subordinate 
hospital employee sources are discouraged through senior 
management behaviors that strongly suggest "stay in your 
place," "Don't rock the boat," "Do your job," and "Keep 
quiet ... 
6. Committee structure seems to be an opportunity to 
stalemate the attempts of Department Managers to move 
their decisions and efforts forward. 
7. Follow-through on decision-making is perceived as an 
unrewarded expectation. 
8. Three positive actions coming from the senior 
management group indicate a constructive effort at 
addressing the organization's chronic problems: the 
approval and financial support of the Belicki (1992) 
study, along with a commitment to follow through with 
corrective actions, CEO approval of this study, and the 
establishment of the Quality Council to oversee the 
adoption of the TQM paradigm. 
103 
Interpretation 
The behavioral norms at The Public Hospital defy 
problem identification, thus system improvement. The 
style of the senior management team is polarized, half as 
administrators, half as managers/leaders. The 
administrative half is in conflict with the styles of the 
hospital's Department Managers, yet its authoritarian 
bureaucratic style of control is the accepted style. The 
atmosphere created is oppressive. Identification of a 
problem is viewed as a corporate defect, something to hide 
rather than work to improve. The Board remains aloof to 
the wounded spirit of the hospital's employees, distant in 
their bureaucratic governance, adhering to their rule of 
non-interference in management, yet leaving an 
organization yearning for leadership. 
Because subordinate leadership is discouraged, 
Department Managers and others from within the hospital 
are denied the opportunity to demonstrate talents and 
abilities below the senior management level. Therefore, 
no framework exists upon which to build trust between the 
CEO and his subordinates. It is a cycle of mistrust and 
suppression. When the CEO fails to trust subordinates' 
abilities, he fails to encourage the exercise of their 
skills. Employees, so controlled, soon acquire a sense of 
helplessness, losing the desire to try (Seligman, 1975 as 
cited in Hoyenga & Hoyenga, 1984). As was indicated 
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within the Department Management interviews, the feeling 
of having given up was pervasive, as were their reports of 
burnout (Belicki, 1992). 
In this researcher's opinion, if the organizational 
reality of the Belicki (1992) study fails to move the 
emphasis at the top (Board and senior management) from the 
importance of things to the value of people, it would be 
unlikely that values and style congruencies can be 
achieved. Problem denial and avoidance will remain 
chronic; Department Manager attempts at self-mastery, 
futile. 
The serious nature of the hospital's chronic problems 
makes their resolution undelegable. If the CEO continues 
to fail to act, and if Board leadership continues to 
flounder, the system will remain status quo. Excellence 
in patient care will remain an illusion. 
Deming (1986) Point #8 
Drive out fear so that everyone may work 
effectively for the company. 
(Empowerment and Teamwork) 
Summary of Research Findings 
1. Behavioral norms expressed by Department Managers 
show that fear is evident in speaking up, making a 
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mistake, risking, trying something new, breeching a rule, 
upsetting the boss, and being over budget. 
2. Because of the Board's uncertain direction, the CEO 
may be fearful of the unknown, failing to please the 
Board, of going over budget, of being in a deficit 
position, of making a mistake, and of looking incompetent. 
3. The CEO behaviors that support fear in the hospital's 
Department Managers include refusing to listen, making 
oneself unavailable, not responding, withholding 
information, strongly adhering to committee structure, 
constantly requesting more information, stalling the 
progress of meetings, demeaning others, distancing through 
physical and/or emotional withdrawal, making decisions 
behind closed doors. 
4. Behaviors evoking fear from one member of the AED 
group include ambiguous behaviors, yelling, fist pounding, 
angry outbursts, withholding information, blaming, 
discrediting, pouting, using inappropriate facial 
expressions. 
5. Anxiety from within the AED team may include fear of 
slowing progress by upsetting the boss, of being excluded 
from the decisional process, and of being fired. 
Interpretation 
The incongruity among mission, values, and style is 
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causing a fragmentation of the organization. When there 
is no perceived connection between what the senior 
leadership professes and what their behaviors demonstate, 
workers cannot trust. When problems are unwelcomed, 
avoided and denied, self-trust is also undermined. The 
evidence of the constant emotional stress that comes from 
working within an environment that is duplicitous is found 
in the results of the Belicki (1992) study. Burnout is 
alarmingly present within The Public Hospital's workforce 
(64.4%), in particular within Department Managers (74.9%); 
of these, 43.8% are suffering at high levels (Belicki, 
1992, p. 30). 
Fear may be at the heart of the cynicism, mistrust, 
poor communication, interpersonal conflict and certainty 
that "they won't change" described by Department Managers. 
The we and they scenario, the separation and segregation 
of levels at the hospital may serve to protect the 
Department Managers by walling them off as an insulated 
group. Collectively, they showed similar dysfunctional 
coping behaviors--blame, excuses, packaging information, 
telling senior management what they want to hear, 
avoidance of conflict, reinforcement of the oligarchy 
through failure to speak up or tell the truth, political 
gamesmanship, and sabotage. The researcher was unable to 
get truly insightful answers to the question of fear at 
The Public Hospital. Respondents could identify fear in 
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connection with economic pressures, job loss, skills 
disincentives, but could not reach into themselves or into 
the organizational essence to a deeper awareness. Anger, 
as the prevailing emotion, was disconnected from its root, 
fear. Fear as defined by Ryan and oestrich (1991), 
"being threatened by possible repercussions as a result of 
speaking up about work-related concerns" (p. 21) in this 
researcher's opinion is so fundamental to the psyche 
(Kilmann, 1989) of The Public Hospital, that further in-
depth study of its root causes would be required before 
the organization could begin to significantly drive it 
out. 
The quality of teamwork between the senior and 
department levels is compromised by intimidation, and is 
therefore less than optimal. Empowerment within such an 
organizational context is severely handicapped. A fuller 
discussion of teamwork and empowerment can be found within 
Deming's (1986) Point #9. 
Deming (1986) Point #9 
Break down barriers between departments. 
(Organizational learning) 
Summary of the Research Findings 
1. Although organizational rhetoric states that The 
108 
Public's people are valued as its greatest resource, 
Department Manager experience negates this concept. They 
believe that they are not seen by the organization as 
worthy of the financial investment necessary to update 
competencies. 
2. Lack of resources supportive of learning is 
profoundly resented by the Department Management group as 
well as a source of fear due to the loss of their 
professional competencies and skills within a competitive 
business environment. 
3. There is an apathy on the part of Department Managers 
about trying anything innovative. Reports of having 
"given up" are pervasive among this group. 
4. Many Department Managers expressed a frustration at 
having to fight for resources to deliver care or to 
fulfill their mandate. 
5. Reports of protective coalitions, resource 
infighting, social (coffee) cliques, colleaguial 
ostracisms, secretiveness, mistrust, resentments, and 
internal competitiveness abound. Catalysts for these 
social constructs tend to be the perception among 
Department Managers of unfair treatment from the senior 
team, usually around educational opportunities, resource 
allocation, or rules application, or due to the 
introduction of some change imposed without their input. 
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Interpretation 
The Public Hospital, in keeping with the bureaucratic 
model, is managed in parts rather than as a whole. 
Segmentation is occurring by level, functional area, 
department, and professional discipline. Because there is 
no organizational alignment with the structure and purpose 
of each segment, each operates in isolation from the 
other. Neither segmented structures nor processes are 
capable of supporting corporate strategies. The 
segmentalist (Kanter, 1983) approach to management is 
utterly opposed to systems thinking. Each segment, 
isolated from the whole, can perceive only its own limited 
egocentric needs (Senge, 1990). The organization is 
fragmented, working out of separateness rather than 
wholeness. Finances are allocated, not from a unifying 
strategy so much as from a limited fragmented 
understanding of the organization's resource needs, and 
how best to plan and meet those requirements. Getting 
one's resource needs met has inspired a breed of political 
gamesmanship that only raises interdepartmental and 
professional role barriers. If the hospital's purpose is 
to provide patient care, why is so much attention devoted 
to finance? What matters gets reviewed. Artificial turf 
wars are therefore created by administrators whose only 
communication with their Department Management team 
focuses on money and things rather than people. 
The clinical multidisciplinary team is itself a 
reflection of the segmentalized whole. Team members, 
caught within professional boundaries, tend to carve up 
patient needs according to whose role gets which need. 
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The professional who transgresses his/her role, who 
believes that an interdisciplinary innovation or unique 
suggestion would be appreciated, risks inciting the team's 
angst. This results in team exile. Health care providers 
can never adequately address the whole-person needs of the 
patient unless they are willing to address their own 
fragmented and distorted understanding of teamwork. 
Attention to organization-wide concerns requires a 
direct connection to shared purpose as a daily operational 
framework. Because no constancy of purpose exists, global 
issues surrender to cross-purposeful conflict. To have 
any true opportunity for health, for wholeness, workers, 
managers, and most importantly patients need cohesive 
systems working together in harmony, with shared purpose 
and values. The Public Hospital will need to invest much 
time and attention into the requirements of team building 
and of systems thinking in order to achieve organizational 
capability. 
Another concern raised by the issue of alignment is 
the inability of the senior management team to set down a 
learning environment in which individual and 
organizational growth are encouraged. without the 
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foundation of a clear mission, vision, and guiding 
principles that direct organizational behaviors and 
ambitions toward improvement, learning cannot be an 
organizational value. If what gets invested in is what 
matters, then people, staff and patients have not been a 
past priority at The Public: appearance has. If 
continuous improvement matters as a value, then learning 
about how to improve should matter. The organization's 
investment in continuing staff development is less than 
one percent of operations. If quality of care and 
customer satisfaction matter, then quality should be 
reviewed, innovation rewarded. Neither of these is 
currently happening. 
Instead, the implicit values and the behavioral norms 
of the Public Hospital run counter to natural curiosity, 
discouraging experimentation and, thus, innovation. 
Essentially, this organization's environment is toxic 
to learning. One must wonder whether the apathy within 
the Department Management group, the reports of burnout 
(Belicki, 1992), the interdepartmental conflict, and 
interprofessional jealousies are not really the physical 
and emotional manifestations of an organizational reality 
that is destroying human potential and the desire to 
learn. 
Deming (1986) Point #12 
Remove barriers that rob employees of their 
pride in workmanship. 
(Reward and recognition) 
Summary of the Research Findings 
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1. Department Managers directly responsible for patient 
care and service areas receive patient feedback. positive 
patient comments give managers great pleasure and a sense 
of satisfaction. Department Managers from non-care areas 
receive recognition for their efforts less often, except 
from peers. Both groups of Department Managers report 
little feedback, either positive or negative, from their 
superiors. 
2. In contrast, Department Managers report attention to 
recognition of the efforts of their subordinates. 
Interpretation 
Individuals within the Department Management group 
yearn for recognition of needs and of efforts. This group 
of individuals strives to fulfill a commitment to quality 
of patient care and quality of worklife for their 
subordinates. They are striving toward this goal, 
however, in the face of discontinuous organizational 
systems and processes. While The Public's leadership, 
whether Board or senior management team, espouse the 
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importance of human values, its actions do not 
fundamentally differentiate people as human resources and 
other material resources. Department Managers struggle 
daily with an intense feeling of demoralization and role 
frustration. This finding is supported by Belicki (1992) 
who found that 74.9% of managers at The Public Hospital 
are suffering from burnout, 43.8% at the severe level. 
without collaborative decision-making, teamwork, 
investment in growth and learning, Department Managers in 
The Public's culture are little more than objects. 
Because health care facilities are staffed mainly with 
woman, this feeling of objectification may be manifested 
as gender bias when in fact it is a traditional system of 
management in conflict with human values. 
Performance feedback, whether to the Board Chairman, 
the CEO, or frontline worker is fundamental to self-
improvement. without attention to individual growth 
needs, employees can feel under-utilized and undervalued. 
Negligence in the provision of effective processes that 
reward and recognize personal and team effort has the 
potential to reduce people to objects. within a culture 
where individuals are treated like pawns, excellence in 
patient care is not possible because patients too are 
viewed as objects to be washed, dressed, fed, done to 
rather than done with. Belicki (1992) found callous 
attitudes, rudeness, and insensitive treatment of patients 
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by The Public Hospital's nursing staff. 
Because the CEO's values and beliefs were those 
identified by Department Managers as most prescriptive of 
behavioral norms within the organization, the place to 
address quality improvement is at the senior manager and 
Board of Governor level. However, the Board will have to 
develop mechanisms for CEO performance appraisal based on 
quality leadership variables, and the AED group will have 
to be willing to provide honest, truthful feedback despite 
their fear of repercussions for speaking up, and the 
problem-avoidance behaviors of the CEO. 
Often people do not receive the information required 
for accurate self assessment and may hold inaccurate 
images of themselves ..• poor or inadequate performance 
can promote avoidance to feedback that could assist 
to improve image. Therefore, the poorer the 
performance, the less accurate is the self-image. 
(Bies & Morrison, 1991 as cited in Daniel 1992, 
p. 537) 
Deming (1986) teaches that workers can only work in 
systems that are designed and maintained by management. 
Without managers who provide opportunities for employee 
involvement, and who solicit worker process-knowledge, 
subordinates are powerless to change the systems in which 
they work. Department Managers, too, are bound by the 
systems and resources made available to them by 
organizational leaders. However, in healthy 
organizations, leaders and subordinates collaborate within 
processes and systems designed to encourage and recognize 
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thinking, learning, and innovation. Managers are expected 
to accept decisional authority. They capitalize on the 
talents and skills of their people, understanding that 
human beings are the embodiment of the organization's 
knowledge, thus its hope for change and growth. In the 
health care industry, where care is the product, and 
quality of care is the organization's source of pride and 
competitive advantage, it is imperative that excellence in 
caring be a leadership ideal for the treatment of 
employees. Health care organizational leaders are called 
upon, more so than those of any other service industry, to 
accept their accountability to make espoused ideals 
behaviorally visible. The stakes are too high to allow 
failure. 
Saunders (1960), a hospice care physician, has 
written that caring for the terminally ill is simple but 
not easy. So it is in caring for the chronically ill 
organization. without courage to continually self-assess, 
to face the chronic problems with leadership performance, 
and without systems to reward and recognize workers' 
efforts, The Public Hospital will continue to provide a 




The Public Hospital's readiness for change is 
dependent upon the senior managers' readiness for change, 
especially that of the CEO. with visible commitment to a 
TQM paradigm, to one single all-encompassing mission, and 
an actionable vision for The Public Hospital of the 
future, the hospital at large will be ready for change. 
Department Managers are prepared to accept a direction in 
which they see themselves as active players, working 
collaboratively to continuously improve the quality of 
care and service. 
The Belicki (1992) study has provided the leadership 
of The Public Hospital an opportunity to look openly and 
honestly at the outcome of their management beliefs, 
values, and practices. In addition, the findings of this 
researcher's culture-relevant study compliment those of 
Belicki (1992), while broadening the understanding of the 
organizational characteristics that are creating an 
environment in which excellence in patient care is an 
improbability. The accountabilities for organizational 
reform lie with the senior team, who must seriously 
examine their philosophies about human needs and 




If the hospital is to move into a TQM paradigm, it is 
imperative to mandate and exploit the following leverage 
points: 
i) the hospital has a congruent mission, a constancy 
of purpose accepted and owned by all employees; 
ii) a deeply unifying vision for the continued 
existence of the hospital must be articulated and shared; 
iii) the senior management team must work diligently 
on behalf of the expression of that vision to put into 
place structures and processes for effective information 
sharing, communication, reward and recognition; 
iv) the existence of fear must be accepted and means 
developed to eliminate fear at all levels of the 
workplace; 
v) the senior management team must work toward a 
systems-integrated approach to management through the 
endorsement and encouragement of teamwork, and other 
collaborative efforts to improve processes; 
vi) a learning culture must be created and 
encouraged. 
Otherwise, opportunities for improvement throughout 
the hospital will continue to be limited, especially at 
the frontline, the final point of hand-off of quality in 
patient care and service. 
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Implications for Theory 
When Kanter (1984), admonishes the practice of 
management by segments; Senge (1990), encourages systems 
thinking; Deming (1986), argues for constancy of purpose, 
and Kilmann (1989), insists on getting to the essence of 
the organization, they are stressing the importance of 
more than simply the financial imperative. This study has 
upheld previous notions (Deming, 1986; Juran, 1989; 
Kanter, 1984; Kilmann, 1989; Senge, 1990; Senge, 1992) 
about the value of shared mission and vision, the positive 
effect and organizational benefit of worker empowerment, 
the corporate potential derived from collaborative 
learning, and the impact of reward for and recognition of 
workers' efforts. In addition, the findings support those 
of Kets de Vries and Miller (1984) who underscore the 
strength of CEO beliefs and characteristics on overall 
organizational performance. 
Patterns of beliefs manifested in behaviors at all 
management levels exemplified the tenacity of implicit 
norms as opposed to adherence to explicit policies and 
rules. Unspoken rules were much better known than those 
rules found within administrative policy manuals. Written 
rules tended to be applied inconsistently while unwritten 
norms were consistently shared and understood. 
Despite the organization's chronic structural and 
process-relevant problems, a sincere commitment to patient 
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care permeated the attitudes of the Department Managers. 
It is perhaps the depth of this commitment that made 
possible the success of care delivered. Essentially, 
Department Managers refused to accept the finance-focused 
mission of the organization at the expense of their 
ability to care for their staff and their patients. 
Langmeyer, Myer, Snyder, and Verderber (1992) found that 
women's corporate mobility tends to be hampered by a 
belief that females lack self-confidence and 
organizational commitment. Accurate and realistic 
feedback are fundamental to increased self-confidence. 
commitment follows agreement with organizational goals. 
Department Managers at The Public Hospital are mainly 
women (73.7%) who refuse to buy into the values in use, 
and who receive very limited performance feedback or 
recognition. These factors support the findings of 
Langmeyer et ale (1992), and may suggest why women at The 
Public Hospital would find difficulty being moved or 
accepted into a senior position. 
criticisms of Total Quality Management 
Holmes, (1993, personal communication) an educator 
within the field of administration, has dismissed Total 
Quality Management as "flaky, the flavor of the month", 
believing that its tenacity to survive the test of time is 
limited. This researcher believes that such conclusions 
are born out of only a superficial understanding of 
Deming's (1986) work. 
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More serious comments come from Wilson (1992) who has 
raised six basic "insights that have taken the bloom off 
the rose" (p. 339): the missionary zeal with which 
advocates expound the merits of a conversion to TQM, the 
consequent banishment of Quality Assurance, the absence of 
in-depth inquiry about TQM's general applicability to all 
facilities including the "need to access a facility's 
readiness for CQI" and to "get the politics right", a 
concern about an "unintentional lack of rigor and honesty 
in the reporting of CQI achievements", and whether CQI is 
a real solution to the larger problems within healthcare 
in Canada--the maintenance of the present system and 
delivery of quality itself (p. 340). 
Schaffer and Thomson (as cited in Wilson, 1992), 
believe concentration on process can lead to 
inattentiveness to results, "The performance improvement 
efforts of many companies have as much impact on 
operational and financial results as a ceremonial rain 
dance has on the weather" (p. 341). However, the 
foregoing seem more cautionary than critical. 
Rather than criticize, perhaps DeBono (1993) is more 
correct to suggest that business should be grateful to 
Deming as the pioneer in TQM/CQI, and then move forward. 
DeBono believes that a preoccupation with quality may mean 
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survival at the risk of obsolescence and complacency. 
The main point is that while the Japanese are 
much concerned with the housekeeping side of 
things ..• they are also concerned with the venture 
side of innovation. western companies sometimes 
think it enough just to get the housekeeping right. 
Everyone knows that Japanese quality owes its origins 
to American Edward[s] Deming, who was then largely 
ignored in the united states because the emphasis was 
on market development. Today the pendulum has swung 
too far the other way. There is an obsession with 
quality to the neglect of venture. (p. 38) 
Both Wilson's (1992) and DeBono's (1993) insights are 
supportive of the preparation of an organizational culture 
bent on continued learning as pre-requisite to the 
delivery of quality, and the means by which to generate 
knowledge for future service quality in healthcare. 
Implications for Future Research 
This descriptive survey of one chronic care and 
rehabilitation hospital raises many questions for future 
research: 
1. Is the Public Hospital representative of the norm in 
health care and its ability to move into a 
quality-focused management paradigm? 
2. Are health care and other publicly funded 
organizations (e.g., educational institutions) less 
able to adapt and respond in functional ways, to 
changing economic, political and social realities than 
their free enterprise counterparts? 
3. What role do educators play in building learning 
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organizations--those that can generate new knowledge 
as well as adapt to new information? Is it 
recommended that educators be appointed senior 
positions within organizational structures? 
4. Because collaboration, team learning, and recognition 
tend to be more feminine traits, do women fare better 
in quality-focused organizations? 
5. Could the corporate-wide application of the theory of 
continuous quality improvement (Deming, 1986; Juran, 
1989) break the glass ceiling (Langmeyer, Myers, 
Snyder, & Verderber, 1992)? 
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Process for submission of ontario hospital recovery plans 
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Appendix B 
Deming's (1986) 14 Points 
1. Create constancy of purpose toward improvement of 
product and service, with a plan to improve 
competitive position and stay in business. 
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2. Adopt the new philosophy. We are in a new economic 
age. We can no longer live with commonly accepted 
delays, mistakes, defective materials and defective 
workmanship. 
3. Cease dependence on mass inspection. Require, 
instead, statistical evidence that quality is built 
in to eliminate the need for inspection on a mass 
basis. 
4. End the practice of awarding business on the basis of 
price tag. Instead, depend on meaningful measures of 
quality, along with price. 
5. Find problems. It is management's job to work 
continually on improving the system. 
6. Institute modern methods of training on the job. 
7. Institute modern methods of supervision. 
8. Drive out fear so that everyone may work effectively 
for the company. 
9. Break down barriers between departments. 
10. Eliminate numerical goals, posters, and slogans that 
seek new levels of productivity without providing 
methods. 
11. Eliminate work standards that prescribe numerical 
goals. 
12. Remove barriers that rob employees of their pride in 
workmanship. 
13. Institute a vigorous program of education and 
training. 
14. Create a structure that will push the prior 13 points 
every day. 
(Gitlow & Gitlow, 1987, p. 20) 
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The [Public] Hospital's Organizational Chart 
Appendix D 
Letter to all managers outling the purpose of the 
study and requesting their participation. 
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Dear Participant 
In December 1991, The [Public] Hospital Board of Governors 
accepted the following recommendation from the staff Quality 
Management Committee, 
That the [Public] Hospital Board of Governors and senior 
managers begin immediately to seek education in TQM/CQI 
so as to adopt and use the theories and methodologies of 
TQM/CQI as their corporate management strategy (Minutes 
of the meeting, Board of Governors, The [Public] 
Hospital, December 23, 1991). 
This decision by the Board created two major opportunities; 
one for [Public] in that utilization of a TQM paradigm will 
assist the hospital in improved outcomes and reduced costs, 
and one for me personally. The decision to change from Q.A. 
to Q.I. has provided me with a subject for my Masters in 
Education thesis. 
Because the incorporation of Total Quality Management 
(TQM) into The [Public's] management practices will mean a 
difference in the way we think about and measure quality, 
some changes will be forthcoming. These changes will be 
gradual and come as the result of an investment in the time 
and resources necessary to be successful with TQM. 
CCHFA is also very supportive of TQM, incorporating 
theory and application into their own business practice. 
Additionally, they are developing a methodology to survey 
hospitals who have moved into TQM. In preparation for future 
surveys it will be important to track where we are going, by 
ever understanding where we are. The point of my research is 
to establish a baseline measure before we undertake the 
change process. In this way, we will be able to measure 
ourselves against ourselves, over time. It is for this 
purpose that I am requesting that you agree to take .part in 
the study by fulfilling the attached questionaires. 
Because my interest is in a composite score (the average 
of all managers and Board Members' scores), there is no need 
to identify yourselves on the instruments. The composite 
should provide us with a picture of our readiness, as an 
organization and as a team, to change. Also, it will depict 
our current knowledge and understanding of TQM so that 
materials and training can be developed to target our future 
direction for education based on needs. 
If you have received prior education in TQM or have taken 
part in g Quality Improvement Team at The [Public]. it would 
-2-
be important for me to know this. Therefore, please indicate 
this Qy placing g check mark on the outside of your 
Questionaires. 
The study results will be reported to all managers as 
part of educational programming as The [Public] begins to 
move toward becoming a TQM organization. 
I have read the above, understand the purpose, and agree 
to take part in this study. 
Signature Date 
Appendix E 
Letter to members of the hospital Board of Governors 
requesting their participation in the study. 
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May 11th 1992 
Dear Trustee 
Attached you will find three questionnairep that have 
been selected as research instruments in my Masters in 
Education program through Brock University. The proposed 
research is titled, organizational Change: Implications of 
Culture and Leadership in the Transformation to Total Quality 
Management. It is my belief that this research will 
compliment my work at The [Public] and will also serve a 
utilitarian purpose for the hospital as we move toward Total 
Quality Management (TQM). 
I respectfully request that you, as a Trustee of The 
[Public] participate in the study for the following reasons: 
The research that I am suggesting will contribute to The 
[Public] Hospital in three very specific ways. 
1. By understanding organizational readiness for change, it 
will assist The [Public] to develop an organizational 
strategy for change to TQM with an accompanying roadmap 
(short/long term quality plan). The Board of Governor's 
awareness is integral to the development and endorsement 
of such a strategy. 
2. It will provide a baseline measure of the organization's 
level of knowledge and skills in TQM theory and 
application. This baseline will assist us to measure 
progress along the path to organizational maturity in 
TQM. 
3. It will guide The [Public] Hospital in the same 
direction as that taken by The Canadian Council on Health 
Facilities Accreditation and the ontario Ministry of 
Health. 
During my most recent work with the CCHFA Total Quality 
Management Taskforce a great deal of time was spent in 
discussing organizational culture and the need for cultural 
changes to be implemented if TQM is to be successful. An 
organization's culture plays a major role in the readiness to 
learn, change, and grow. In fact, some of the indicators of 
readiness and commitment as suggested by the Taskforce are as 
follows: 
- initial and continuing education of Board members 
- application of TQM in Board processes 
-2-
- Board monitoring of TQM implementation 
- development of a short/long term strategic quality 
plan 
- evidence of how senior management have organized to 
implement the vision of quality 
- evidence of management's commitment to allocation of 
resources 
In addition, CCHFA will be looking for evidence of 
organizational maturation in TQM by measuring organizational 
performance against itself, over time. To accomplish this, 
The Public would need to establish a baseline measurement of 
organizational knowledge and behaviors indicative of a TQM 
organization. 
The enclosed instruments are those selected; each 
requires approximately 15-20 minutes to complete. The 
expense of the instruments (close to $1,500.00), and the 
actual research time will be absorbed by me, as researcher. 
Mr. J. has approved the study and the management team at The 
[Public] has already taken part. 
I ask that you complete ONLY the questions contained 
within each survey and audit. Please do not disassemble the 
instruments. Answer all questions candidly. If you find 
some questions difficult, approach them by placing yourself 
in the position of manager/leader and answer from the 
perspective of how you believe you would respond within that 
circumstance. The scores will be compiled to form a 
composite of all Trustees responses. Hence, there is no need 
to identify yourself and any additional comments you may wish 
to include will be kept confidential. 
A final report of the study results can be made 
available to you, including, if you so choose, a presentation 
on the findings with a strategy concerning any recommended 
TQM education/training programs planned as an outcome. 
For your convenience, I have enclosed a self-addressed, 
stamped envelop. I very much appreciate your consideration 
of my request, and I look forward to receiving your completed 
surveys and audit by May 25th. 
sincerely, 






Developed by John E. Jones, Ph.D. 






Orientation Scale (OCOS) 
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The purpose of this inventory is to help you to learn some important things about your behavior in 
organizational change situations. In order to prepare for this self-assessment, think about two or three re-
cent organizational changes in which you were involved. Briefly describe these in the boxes below. 
Change A: 
How you behaved: 
Change B: 
How you behaved: 
Change C: 
How you behaved: 
This inventory contains thirty-six items regarding how you relate to organizational change. Referring to the 
situations that you described above, rate each of the inventory items on the following scale. There are no 
"right" or "wrong" answers to the items, only what is true for you. Be honest with yourself, and think 
carefully about each response. 
Please record your rating for each item by circling the appropriate letter combination on the Response 
Form which follows. 
Response Scale: AA 
VO 
SO 
= Almost Always 





Not Very Often 
Seldom 
Almost Never 
© 1985. 1986 John E. Jones, Ph.D. and William L. Bearley, Ed.D. Published by Organization Design and Development, Inc. under an exclusive license from the copyright owners. 
INVENTORY 
Directions: Using the Response Form, please circle the letter combination of the response that most 
closely resembles your personal approach to handling organizational change. 
In managing organizational change . .. 
1. I try to find out right away how organizational changes might affect me. 
2. I do not get involved significantly in organizational change. 
3. I look for scapegoats when organizational changes trouble me. 
4. People who know me would describe me as proactive. 
5. I tend to "moan and groan" about organizational changes. 
6. I hide my opposition to organizational change. 
7. My response to organizational change is to ask, "What's in it for me?" 
8. I find myself often complaining about changes in this organization. 
9. I attempt to undermine organizational changes with which I disagree. 
10. I initiate changes that I believe are needed. 
11. I do not express my points of view about organizational changes. 
12. I sabotage what I believe to be misguided organizational changes. 
13. I use systematic methods to make organizational changes work. 
14. I take a neutral position on organizational changes. 
15. I blame others for my troubles with organizational changes. 
16. I try to "stay two steps ahead" in expectation of needed changes. 
17. A "wait and see" attitude about organizational changes usually suits me. 
18. When I resist changes, I am open about it. 
19. My major approach to organizational change is problem solving. 
20. I withhold support for organizational changes. 
21. I work actively against organizational changes with which I disagree. 
22. I am the kind of person who makes change happen. 
23. Usually I "go along with" organizational changes. 
24. I tend to blame others for problems with organizational changes. 
25. I attempt to anticipate the need for changes in the work place. 
26. I do not take sides on organizational changes. 
27. My normal reaction to organizational changes is passive resistance. 
28. I look ahead for potential barriers to goal attainment. 
29. I follow rather than lead in organizational change. 
30. I use covert methods to thwart unnecessary organizational changes. 
31. I take a personal approach to evaluating upcoming organizational changes. 
32. I do not actively support organizational changes. 
33. I make visible attempts to resist organizational changes. 
34. I look for solutions to problems created by organizational change. 
35. I participate in gripe sessions about organizational changes. 
36. I am not open with my dissent to organizational changes. 
© 1985, 1986 John E, Jones, Ph.D. and William L. Bearley, Ed.D. Published by Organization Design and Development, Inc. under an exclusive license from the copyright owners. 
RESPONSE FORM 
Directions: 
For each item, circle the letters of the response 
that best indicates how often your approach 
is like the behavior described. Use the follow-
ing key. 
Key: AA = Almost Always 
VO = Very Often 
SO = Sometimes 
NVO = Not Very Often 
SE = Seldom 
AN = Almost Never 
Press hard using a ballpoint pen. Your 
responses are being recorded on the scoring 
form below. 
When you have completed your responses, 
tear along the perforation and follow the direc-
tions for scoring. 





















































































WJ ~ AA NVO AA NVO 
va SE va SE 
SO AN SO AN 
WJ NVO ~ AA AA NVO 
va SE va SE 
SO AN SO AN 
lJU ~ 
AA NVO AA NVO 
va SE va SE 
SO AN SO AN 
~ ~ AA NVO AA NVO 
va SE VO SE 
SO AN SO AN 
l!±J ~ 
AA NVO AA NVO 
va SE va SE 
SO AN SO AN 
~ ~ AA NVO AA NVO 
va SE va SE 
SO AN SO AN 
~ ~ AA NVO AA NVO 
VO SE va SE 
SO AN SO AN 
~ ~ AA NVO AA NVO 
va SE va SE 
SO AN SO AN 
~ ~ AA NVO AA NVO 
va SE va SE 
SO AN SO AN 
~ 22J AA NVO AA NVO 
va SE va SE 
SO AN SO AN 
lEJ ~ 
AA NVO AA NVO 
va SE va SE 
SO AN SO AN 
~ ~ AA NVO AA NVO 
va SE va SE 
SO AN SO AN 
© 1986 John E. Jones, Ph.D. and William L. Be.rley, Ed.D. Published by Organization Design and Development, Inc. under an exclusive license from the copyright owners. 
SCORING FORM 
circled in each of the three 
place the sumS, in the boxes pro-
have separate totals for your 
unc.t1011alitllld Dysfunctional 
~arclmg change. 
is completed turn the page 
)retaucm of your scores. 
























































































































































Ph.D. and William L. Bearley, Ed.D. Published by Organization Design and Development, Inc. under an exclusive license from the copyright owners. 
Your Orientation to Change-Profile 
To create a graphic representation of your orientation to change, place an "X" on each of the three scales in 
the triangular model below, to correspond to each of the three scores that you calculated on the scoring 
worksheet. Then, connect these three points with straight lines to form a "triangular" space within the 
model. Shade in your space. If you scored a "zero" on two of the scales, you will produce a single straight 




Responses to organizational change vary widely among people. Some embrace change, others remain 
neutral, while some resist it, almost in a "knee~jerk" manner. The Organizational Change Orientation 
Scale (OCOS) helps you to see your usual pattern of behaviors related to organizational change. You will 
be able to see the probable effects of your responses on yourself and the system. 
It is useful to consider that the ways in which people behave with regard to change can be classified into 
roughly three categories, or three bags full of approaches. Of course, these categories are somewhat ar-
bitrary, but they help us to make choices about how we can maximize the effectiveness of change efforts. 
The three categories are: Functional, Nonfunctional and Dysfunctional. 




Functional - The first category consists of behaviors that support transformational processes in 
organizations. The responses are: 
1. Making change happen 
This is the behavior that is most supportive of organizational transformation. People who behave this 
way take personal responsibility to initiate improvements. 
2. Anticipating the need for change 
Personnel who think futuristically also look at the possible effects of environmental change on the 
system. They are sensitive to the need for innovation inside the organization. 
3. Problem solving 
This response to organizational change consists of using systematic techniques to make decisions about 
procedural modifications. The person who is oriented to this behavior looks for ways of making change 
work. 
4. Self assessment 
This response is answering the question, "What's in it for me; how will it affect me?" For people to feel 
committed to supporting alterations in organizational life, they must make a personal connection to 
them. 
These four sets of behaviors constitute Functional responses to change. They are proactive, positive, asser-
tive, and productive. People who consistently engage in these responses actively support change. They im-
merse themselves in organizational improvements and innovation. In other words, they are moving toward 
change. 
Nonfuncfional- These four sets of behaviors neither support nor resist organizational betterments. The 
responses are: 
5. Agreement without commitment 
People who adopt this stance "go along with" changes rather than giving their full support. Verbal 
endorsement is not matched by supportive behavior. 
6. Fence sitting 
This behavior involves not taking a stand on changes. People who are either indecisive or unwilling to 
commit themselves tend to avoid "going public" with their points of view about organizational 
alterations. 
7. Withholding support 
This response means that the person is slightly less supportive of change than "fence sitting." Here the 
person does not work against change but vocalizes a lack of backing for it. 
© 1985, 1986 John E. Jones, Ph.D. and William L. Bearley, Ed.D. Published by Organization Design and Development, Inc. under an exclusive license from the copyright owners. 
8. Moaning and groaning 
Complaining about organizational changes may be cathartic, but it does not aid the process of improve-
ment. People who participate in gripe sessions about system reforms are behaving nonfunctionally. 
This category of responses is labeled Nonfunctional. These behaviors are inactive, neutral, submissive, 
and nonproductive. People who display many of these activities are neither supportive of organizational 
improvements, nor are they significantly resistive. In other words, they are moving away from change. 
Dysfunctional - The third "bag full" of responses to shifts in organizational processes involves active 
resistance. The behaviors are: 
9. Blaming and finger pointing 
Externalizing responsibility for the effects of structural and procedural changes often takes this form. 
People who engage in this activity are working against organizational renewal. 
10. Passive resistance 
Here the person is covert in attempting to block change. There also is the denial of responsibility for 
nonsupport as well as for the effects of change. 
11. Overt resistance 
People who actively resist change in organizations are sometimes open about it. Here the person 
publicly protests against modifications. This behavior may include defiance. 
12. Sabotage 
The most dysfunctional response to change is to undermine it. Resistance becomes covert and destruc-
tive. People who disagree with changes sometimes want the changes to fail in order to be right. 
This final category is Dysfunctional. The behaviors are reactive, negative, aggressive, and counter-
productive. People who resist change often engage in subterranean activities. In other words, they are mov-
ing against change. 
The Organizational Change Orientation Model 
The triangular model on the next page shows the three categories of responses to organizational change, 
with a summary of the characteristics of each. The theory says that organizations are in a continuous state 
of change and that resistance is inevitable. There always is motion in response to change-moving toward, 
away from, or against. These three broad sets of behaviors are not mutually exclusive. A person may 
display any combination of responses to a given organizational-reform effort. 
It is important to note that not all resistance to change is negative. When Functional activities are applied 
to improve the change itself to make it work better, such "resistance" is in the service of effectiveness. 
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The model indicates directions of response to change. What happens inside individuals in the face of in-
novation is a shift of energy. If the change is threatening, energy is transformed in a negative direction. 
Some people neutralize their energy when faced with change. When the person sees the potential benefits 























The three profiles below depict individuals who engage primarily in one of the three types of behavioral 
responses to organizational change. They show a person who embraces innovation in a Functional manner, 
one whose activities are Nonfunctional, and one who resists change in Dysfunctional ways. 
Functional 
Nonfunctional Dysfu nctiona I 
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The next three profiles show patterns of behavior that include two sets of responses. The first depicts a per-
son who responds to organizational change in either Functional or Nonfunctional ways (Toward or Away 
From). The second illustrates a pattern of behavior that is nonsupportive of innovation - either Nonfunc-
tional or Dysfunctional (Away From or Against). The third indicates that the person possibly is polarized 




The final sample profile shows a person who engages in all three "bags full" of responses to about the same 
degree. This pattern can be exhibited by an indecisive or impulsive person. Of course, this person may 
carefully discriminate among changes and choose responses accordingly. 
Multi-Directional 
Your Profile 
The profile that you shaded in on page 5 is not your fingerprint. It represents how you would most probably 
behave in organizational change situations. Here are some questions to consider in making sense out of 
your profile: 
1. What is your general pattern? 
2. How does it compare with the seven sample profiles above and on the previous page? 
3. How does it match your general view of how you behave? 
4. What "payoffs" are you getting from this approach to change? 
5. How might you be more effective? 
6. What proactive behaviors can you start right away? 
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7. How does your profile match those of your manager, your peers, and your subordinates? 
8. How might you work together better to make changes? 
9. What do you need to do to improve the way your people respond to change? 
10. What changes are needed in your work right now? 
Promoting Organizational Readiness 
The healthiest organizational situation is for large numbers of people to be engaging consistently in proac-
tive, or Functional, behaviors. The most direct way to create that situation is to involve people in decision-
making with regard to organizational improvements. System change is ultimately a change in people's 
behavior. Nonfunctional and Dysfunctional responses to change can be obviated only by involving 
employees in ways that lead to commitment. 
On Commitment 
The ideal situation regarding organizational change would be for everyone to take initiatives for im-
provements, to share the burden and to capitalize on the opportunities for ameliorating situations that need 
attention. Most managers, however, fail to reward this behavior and it soon drops out. At best, employee 
participation in making spontaneous gains in quality and quantity of production could be described as non-
functional. When people feel powerless to affect changes, often they resort to dysfunctional responses. 
We have said that organizational change goes on all the time. In other words, "the status is never quo." 
Employees are continuously responding to how they are being treated, particularly to how influential they 
feel in affecting decisions that affect them. When they feel powerful, they psychologically move toward 
commitment to making the change work for the benefit of the organization. When they feel powerless, they 
either alienate themselves or engage in resistance. 
There is no formula for generating commitment. Clearly, commitment represents an attitude shift toward 
willingness to support innovation actively. If attitudes can be thought of as rationalizations for behavior, 
then if we get people to behave differently, their attitudes will "catch-up" later. The Law of Commitment 
states that the first step is behavioral: 
Meaningful participation - l~a~~t~------
sense of involvement, which evokes a 
feeling of influence, that generates 
psychological ownership, - that results in 
commitment. 
"There is more truth than poetry" in this law. There are no shortcuts to commitment. Rah-rah speeches do 
not create lasting commitment. People have to work together on organizational change, with a sense of pro-
gress, in order to develop commitment. The shift inside the individual begins with seeing participation as 
personally relevant. 
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How can you tell whether an organizational change has been made in a way that results in commitment? 
You are willing to do what it takes to make change work when you have these thoughts and feelings about 
it: 
You will stake your reputation on the change. 
You have no lingering doubts about what has been planned. 
You are not reconsidering or looking back. 
You have no contrary thought about the change. 
You have an expectation of winning. 
You have left nothing undone. 
You are passionately protective of the desired outcomes. 
You are intensely loyal to the organization. 
Championing Change 
Entrepreneurs and "change masters" actively initiate change in order to realize their objectives. They 
routinely engage in Functional behaviors. Their stance regarding innovation is proactive, positive, asser-
tive, and productive. When such leaders are unhappy with proposed or impending changes, their resistance 
still takes a Functional form. They attempt to modify changes to make them work better. 
Your Challenge 
Since awareness precedes meaningful choice, you already have taken the first step toward making decisions 
about your personal orientation to change. You are not "locked in" to your profile. You can begin to alter 
your own responses to organizational changes by first noticing your "automatic" reactions; second, remin-
ding yourself of your desire to modify your stance; and then third, committing yourself to Functional 
behaviors. 
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The purpose of this questionnaire is to help you analyze the ability of your organization to manage change 
effectively. It is important that you think of a definite organization in which you are involved directly, so 
that your perceptions will be valuable in the analysis. Write the name of the organization (division/depart-
ment/unit) below: 
This questionnaire is easily "faked:' Each item has been found to relate positively to effective innovation 
and change in organizations, so you could easily make the organization look good by rating each 
characteristic high. The analysis would, in that case, most probably be useless. It is vital that you mark 
each item as you genuinely see it rather than how you think it should be. That way, both positive strengths 
and barriers to effectiveness can be studied. 
For each item, indicate the degree to which you believe your organization engages in the practice des-
cribed. Record your response to each question by circling the appropriate letter combination on the 
Response Form which follows. Use the key below. 
Key: NA = Not At All 
VLO = To a Very Little Degree 
LO = To a Little Degree 
SO = To Some Degree 
GO = To a Great Degree 
VGO = To a Very Great Degree 
Please turn the page and begin. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE 
Directions: Please use the Response Form on the opposite page. For ea.ch item, circle the letter(s) of the response 
that best indicates the degree to which you believe your organization engages in the practice described. 
To what degree does this organization . .. 
I. show the ability to institutionalize and regularize changes? 
2. seem forward looking? 
3. invest in the development of new technology? 
4. show commitment to excellence? 
5. have the ability to inspire people toward the unknown? 
6. have effective internal communications? 
7. stress that every employee is in the marketing business? 
8. have influential people who are dissatisfied with 
the status quo? 
9. take decisive action? 
10. stick to the business it is best at? 
11. stay on the lookout for new technology? 
12. have a policy of employee participation? 
13. have a climate that supports experimentation? 
14. evidence commitment to quality? 
15. view its people as resources? 
16. have internal change facilitators? 
17. show a tolerance for role ambiguity? 
18. indicate clearly what business it is in? 
19. engage in visionary futuring? 
20. reinforce creative behaviors? 
21. root its internal politics in improvement rather than 
in empire building? 
22. reward organizational improvements? 
23. show flexibility at the top? 
24. reward people who are mavericks or nonconformists? 
25. have a sales-and-service orientation? 
26. tolerate temporariness well? 
27. take ideas from its customers? 
28. avoid restricting itself by precedent and tradition? 
29. support "off-line" innovation (skunk works, 
intrapreneurship )'1 
30. have measurement systems to assess the effects of 
organizational changes? 
31. practice participative management? 
32. have the ability to manage consensus? 
33. have a clear vision of the future? 
34. show structural simplicity? 
35. show technological readiness for the future? 
36. have an expectation of an abundant future? 
37. reward mistakes? 
38. have the ability to handle disruptions in its 
internal processes? 
39. tie its innovations to groups rather than individuals? 
40. experience externally-induced change? 
41. have a widely understood mission? 
42. have an explicit formula for success? 
43. avoid placing undue stress on its people? 
44. have intense interactions among its management? 
45. have a reward system that is responsive to change? 
46. support people who champion change? 
47. have a clear sense of direction (where it is going)') 
48. seem to be in control of its own destiny? 
49. have a proactive climate? 
50. monitor its external environment for cues that indicate 
needed internal changes? 
51. have people who can personally handle working in a 
climate of change? 
52. show the ability to cope with paradox? 
53. have units of manageable size? 
54. have its own unique rituals? 
55. have tightly linked systems? 
56. tolerate individual differences among its people? 
57. show structural flexibility, including having 
temporary structures? 
58. avoid the build-up of crisis situations? 
59. have appropriate system redundancy? 
60. have employees who are aware of their individual 
contributions? 
61. have a clear set of values (what it stands for)? 
62. have a prevailing theory of management that 
supports change? 
63. have bureaucratic forms that are essentially benign? 
64. have employees who personally identify with 
the organization? 
65. seem market driven? 
66. support democratic values? 
67. have effective information systems? 
68. have top management that is determined to 
institute change? 
69. experience pressure for change? 
70. show a team spirit? 
71. provide effective training and education for its people? 
72. have the ability to manage conflict? 
73. actively choose among alternative futures? 
74. have its own mythology? 
75. utilize a vision-oriented goal-setting process? 
76. have a partnership atmosphere between management 
and labor? 



















of the degree 
to which this 
organization 




















Organizational Change - Readiness Survey 
Key: NA = Not At All 
VLD = To A Very Little Degree 
LD = To A Little Degree 
so = To Some Degree 
GO = To A Great Degree 
VGO = To A Very Great Degree 
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The Organizational Change-Readiness Survey includes five categories of items, each of which IS 






The ability to keep a clear vision and to reorganize quick-
ly and easily in response to external change and 
opportunity. 
The ability to remain current and innovative in the 
exploitation of material resources and know-how. 
Having an internal ambience that supports people and 
planned-change efforts. 
Having systems in place that scan and provide informa-
tion necessary to monitor effects of change. 
Having managers and workers who can work productive-
ly together within an environment that is ambiguous and 
in flux. 
The five dimensions of change-readiness are depicted ·below. The model shows them as independently 
affecting readiness. It is likely, however, that these dimensions are correlated with each other within your 
organization. That is, they may tend to be mixed, or interdependent. Your organization may have several 






The concept of change-readiness is similar to that of reading readiness. Until a child becomes "ready" to 
learn to read, hardly any method of teaching will be successful; but when he/she is ready, almost any 
technique will work. Accordingly, you may acknowledge a need to lose weight or quit smoking; but until 
you are "ready;' you are not likely to succeed. In an analogous way, organizations differ with respect to 
their ability to manage change productively-their change-readiness. The OCRS maps your assessment of 
your organization's present ability to deal satisfactorily with change and innovation. 
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The five dimensions of the Survey help you think about what to emphasize in improving the change-
readiness of the organization that you described. You isolated a number of both supports and barriers. The 
supports are represented by the number of "O's" for each change category. The barriers are represented by 
the number of "X's" for each category. 
Your Organization's Change-Readiness 
To obtain a clearer picture of your organization's change-readiness, a Force-Field type chart has been pro-
vided on the next page. l First plot each of your scores for Structural, Technological, Climatic, Systemic 
and People readiness. The "X's" should be recorded in the upper portion of the chart in the Barriers sec-
tion. The "O's" should be placed in the lower Supports section. Connect the recorded marks in the Barriers 
section to form a plot line; then connect the marks to form a plot line in the Supports section. These lines 
represent your perception of your organization's change-readiness at the present time. If your entire work 
group has completed the Survey, plot the averages of the group members Barrier and Support scores. Use 
a dotted line to distinguish the group's perceptions from your own. If your total organization has completed 
this Survey, you may be able to plot a third set of Barrier/Support scores on the chart. 
Using the Force-Field Problem Solving Model to Improve 
Your Organizational Change-Readiness 
The Force-Field Analytic Problem Solving Model was developed by Kurt Lewin in the 1940's. His approach 
provides a convenient and effective method for surfacing the forces that impact a problem and then 
building a strategy to strengtht;n the forces for change (Supports) and weaken the forces inhibiting change 
(Barriers) . 
The Force-Field approach can be used to deal with the data from the OCRS. In general, you (or your group 
or organization) can ... 
1. Build on the Supports that you uncovered, strengthening their ability to drive change in 
the system; 
2. Overcome the Barriers, seeking to minimize their negative effects on introducing 
change in the organization; 
3. Attempt to do both - increase the pressure for change through strengthening Supports 
and at the same time trying to overcome the Barriers; 
4. Do nothing. 
Kurt Lewin strongly suggested that the best strategy is to work on overcoming barriers to change-readiness. 
He has said that any organizational situation that appears to be static can be thought of as a temporary 
equilibrium of opposing forces. Overcoming organizational deficiencies and resistances permits the natural 
thrust of supporting forces to push toward productive change. 
1. Kurt Lewin is the originator of the Force-Field Analytic Problem Solving Model. The complete exercise is available from Organization Design 
and Development and could be used in conjunction with the data you have obtained. 
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Major Change Strategies 
The following chart outlines thirteen broad approaches* to initiating change in organizations. Each strategy is 
described according to its most common activities and its assets and potential liabilities. Study this chart for ideas 
to improve the Barriers that you identified in your Force-Field diagram. 
Strategy Common Activities Assets Potential Liabilities 
Clinical Counseling Sensitive Must Be Voluntary 
Psychotherapy Private Low Task Focus 
Employee Assistance Individually Paced Low "Wattage" 
Programs Timely Potentially Harmful 
Support Groups Intensive 
Personal-Growth Groups 
Confrontation Confrontation Meetings Realistic Blowups 
"Shootouts" Uses Power Effectively Stalemates 
Third-Party Interventions Enrolls Significant People Alienation 
Negotiations Followthrough Avoidance 
"Getting Even" 
Consultative Outside Consultative Fresh Ideas and Solutions "Canned" Solutions 
Assistance Objectivity Expense 
Co-Consultation Thoroughness Delay 
Special Expertise Superficiality 
Lack of Ownership 
Economic Changing the Reward Quick Conformity Issues of Fairness 
System Lasting Change Precedent 
Increasing Resources Pervasive Effects Risk of Investment 
Educational Training New Knowledge and Skills Meeting the Wrong Needs 
Seminars Rewards "Canned," "Off the Shelf" 
Symposia Preparation for Change "Charm Schools" 
University Programs Little Transfer 
"Dog and Pony Shows" 
Engineering Changes in Physical Hawthorne Effect May Seem Arbitrary or 
Surroundings New Alliances Discriminatory 
(Walls, Office Locations, Visible Progress Unintended Effects 
Lighting, Decorations, etc.) Changed Interactions Poor Communications 
*Several of these strategies are adapted from Kurt E. Olmusk, "Seven Pure Strategies of Change." In The 1972 Annual Handbook for Group Facilitators, 
JW. Pfeiffer and lE. Jones, Eds., University Associates, San Diego, CA, 1972 . 
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Strategy Common Activities Assets Potential Liabilities 
Kampai Drinks After Work Promotion of Confrontation Poor Problem Solving 
"Power Lunches" Low-Conflict Negotiation Blowups 
Confrontations, with Lack of Foliowthrough 
Alcohol Escapes from Responsibility 
Military Threats Quick Resistonce 
Forced Compliance Clear Alienation 
Limit Setting Use of Power Hostility 
Tight Controls Aggressive Nonconformity 
Reinforces Hierarchy Insensitivity 
PartiCipatory Task Forces Commitment Slow Processes 
Focus Groups Varied Inputs "Ins and Outs" Mentality 
Sensing Meetings Shared Understanding "Groupthink" 
Group Decision-Making More Expertise Inappropriate Uses 
Political "Horsetrading" Sensitive to Power Organization by the 
Win-Lose Analysis Distributions Disenfranchised 
Image-Damage Analysis Quick Retribution 
Deck Stacking Foliowthrough Blowups 
Builds Coalitions Resistance 
Procedural Changes in Work Flow and Visible May Treat Symptoms 
Processes Focus on Efficiency Resistance 
Procedural Fixes Pervasive Effects May Create Two Sets 
Rules Changes Quick of Rules 
Changes in Reporting Fixable 
Methods 
Structural Reorganization Focus on the Manageable Requires Consensus on 
Open Communications Visible Values and Goals 
Changes in Rewards and Clarity May Change Valued 
Accountabilities Task Centered Features of the System 
Technological New Hardware/Software Improved Efficiency Threats to Job Security 
Robotics Market Edge Resistance 
Increased Safety Need to Upgrade People 
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Planning Worksheet 




2. Using the Scoring Form, find those items for the categories identified above where the X's are circled, 
and circle those item numbers on the questionnaire. 
3. Read the items you circled that contributed to the higher Barrier scores. Look for key ideas or 
characteristics that best describe the barrier. 
4. From the table of Major Change Strategies select one or more strategies that you believe would best 
help to decrease the barrier. Write a detailed plan below for improving these organizational 
characteristics. 
Strategy 
What specifically will be done: 
Who (especially you) will take action: 
When will the action be expected to produce results: 
Where will the action be taken: 
Why is the action being undertaken: 
How much do you hope to achieve by the improvement: 
Organization Design and Development, Inc. 
Organization Design and Development, Inc. publishes experiential learning materials, provides organizational learning experiences, and consults 
in program design. Founded in lCJ77, the company is headquartered in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania. The HRD Quarterly, a catalog of experiential 
learning materials for trainers and group facilitators, is published by OD&D Resources, a division of Organization Design and Development, 
Inc. and is distributed throughout the world. 
Author Biographies 
Dr. John E. Jones. An independent consultant, John probably is best known as co-founder of University Associates and co-editor of experience-
based training and consulting handbooks, and annuals. He consults widely, with such clients as AT&T, GMC, Holiday Inns, Xerox, Burroughs, 
Kaiser-Permanente, Wallace Computer Services, Turner Construction, Carew Positional Selling Systems, ARC International (Tokyo), Air Canada, 
and numerous not-for-profit organizations in education, government, health care, and fund raising. John is co-author, with Mike Woodcock, MP, 
England, of Manual of Management development: Strategies, Designs and Instruments for Programme Improvement, Gower Publishing Co., 
Brookfield, VT. 1985. 
Dr. William L. Bearley. An independent consultant, Bill is an information systems and organization development consultant who combines 
computer expertise with a solid background in human resources. He has collaborated with John on instrumentation in team building, burnout, 
and organizational change. He consults with numerous clients, such as Honeywell, Xerox, AT&T and many educational and health care 
organizations. Bill in a graduate of UA laboratory-education intern program. He has pioneered the fusion of OD with the introduction of 
management information systems. 
1985. 1986 John E. Jones, Ph.D. and William L. Bearley. Ed.D. Published by Organization Design and Development. Inc. under an exclusive license from the copyright owners. 


Quality Improvement Audit For Leaders 
Check the answer which you believe to be the most accurate for your present situation. 
Attitudes and Beliefs About Quality Improvement True False 
I believe that: True False 5. correcting mistakes as they happen. 
1. mistakes and defects should be 6. the constant measurement of 
caught during final evaluation or customer or client satisfaction. inspection. ----
----
2. problems related to quality are 7. a thorough inspection of the end pro-
most often the fault of employees, duct to control quality. 
vendors or equipment. 
----
8. slogans and goals for employees. 
3. continuous training and education 9. telling the worker only what he needs 
for my staff is vital. 
----
to know to do his job. 
4. my "gut feeling" is the key to our 10. competition between departments. 
problem solving. 
11. reducing fear that employees will be 
5. innovation is the key to quality. blamed. 
----










8. customers or clients define what 14. awarding business to the lowest 
quality is. 
----
bidders to cut costs. 
9. planning and prevention lead to 15. training employees for specific job skills. 
quality. 
---- 16. continuously striving to improve pro-
10. we must work on everything to in- ducts and services. 
----
crease quality. 
17. establishing a clear quality mission for 
11. we must build in quality. the organization. 
----
12. we must meet deadlines as the way 18. the constant use of statistical process 
to satisfy customers. 
----
control tools to measure quality. 
----
13. it is always cheaper to do it right 19. the identification of a vital few 
the first time. 
----
problems to improve quality. 
----
14. data and facts should be the basis 20. a system of teams and employee in-
for decision-making. 
----
volvement to solve problems. 
----
15. we should improve the person Employee Involvement 
responsible or move him/her. 
---- My leadership in this organization is 
16. competition between departments is characterized by: True False 
good for quality. 
---- 1. providing an on-the-job skills training 
17. a threat-free environment is best to program. ----
encourage quality. 2. involving all employees in organiza-
18. work is an art. tional improvements in quality, cost, 
19. I must build partnerships with my 
and working conditions. 
staff. 
----
3. top down management. 
20. I must develop multiple skills and 4. working for employee commitment to 
competencies in my employees. 
----
achieve customer or client satisfaction. 
----
5. the design of a work environment 
Quality Improvement Knowledge which meets human needs. ----
It is my understanding that quality 6. having my top management team 
improvement involves: True False establish the system in which 
1. the idea that everything is a process employees can produce quality ser-
to be standardized, controlled, and vices and products. ----
improved. 
----
7. setting up a system of teams which in-
2. the standardization of methods as volve all employees in quality 
a basis for control and the prere- improvement. ----
quisite for improvement. 
----
8. providing self-training manuals to all 
3. meeting strict production or comple- my employees. ----
tion quotas. 
----
9. providing a problem-solving process 
4. the practice of reliable methods in for my employee teams. ----
a disciplined way by all. 
----
10. instituting a plan, do, check and act 
team process. 
----
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QupJity Improvement Audit For Leaders 
the answ~r ,which you believe to be the most accurate for your present situation. 
Quality Improvement Audit For Leaders 
PART 2 
Use of Data True False 
Under my leadership, this organization: True False 5. committing to purchase a quality im-
1. is committed to the need for deci- provement book for each of my top 
sions which are made on the basis managers. ----
of facts and data. 6. putting quality improvement activities 
2. believes that some quality items into action. ----
cannot be measured. 7. revising policies to conform to quality 
3. has learned to use statistical pro- improvement procedures. ----
cess control tools. B. attending quality improvement training 
4. involves employees in some type of sessions for employees. ----
daily plotting, displaying, and 9. working to fix the organization's 
analysis of data. system which affects quality. 
----
5. assumes that facts are correct and 10. committing to "leaps" in product and 
are to be used for decision-making. service development. 
----
6. uses such tools as flow charts, 
Pareto diagrams, check sheets, and Personal Leadership Style 
brainstorming. 
----
My leadership style related to quality 
7. provides its employees with key improvement includes: True False 
performance indicators for major 1. allowing others to express their 
processes. 
----
opinions without fear. 
----
B. has established a threat-free culture 2. delegating to others according to their 
to support the exchange of data. 
----
ability to do the task. 
----
9. has a few key employees who col- 3. teaching quality improvement teams 





10. uses data to determine the extent 4. using facts to improve on tried and 
of variability from previously tested methods instead of launching 
established norms. untested innovations. 
----
11. uses convergence thinking only. 5. pushing the decision-making process 
12. rewards the quality of ideas about quality down to include even the 
employees suggest in team lowest employee. 
----
meetings. 6. providing a feedback system for every 
13. uses data to determine where the employee. 
----
greatest problems are. 7. letting others take responsibility for 
14. uses a cause-and-effect diagram to quality improvement while I take care 
solve problems. of business. 
----
15. uses the Pareto analysis to deter- B. being attuned to both internal and ex-
mine the major few problems. 
---- ternal customer needs. 
16. collects data to be used immediate- 9. being systematic. Iy to facilitate the correction of 
problems. 
----
10. stressing teamwork and rewarding it. 
17. uses graphic presentations of 11. praising those who meet production 
data to get a "picture" of the quotas. 
----
situation. 
---- 12. providing supervision which helps 
1B. uses data to prevent over and employees, machines and systems do 
under adjustment. 
----
a better job. 
----
19. uses data to achieve never ending 13. cutting costs related to training and 
quality improvement. 
----
human resource development. 
----
20. looks for variation in products or 14. relating my vision of quality improve-
services to determine quality ment to all employees. 
----problems. 15. focusing on the process, on the team, 
My Commitment to QUality Improvement on the system that will produce long-
I have demonstrated my commitment to term quality. ----
quality improvement by: True False 16. reworking or throwing out defective 
1. changing my management strategy parts or materials. 
to quality improvement practices. 
---- 17. listening to our customers. 
2. converting my top management 1B. providing involvement, information, team to quality improvement prin- good equipment and tools, and super-
ciples, methods, and techniques. 
visors who care. 
----3. focusing training on my top 
management team. 19. communicating to employees why 
4. developing a clear plan for im-
changes are necessary. 
----
plementing quality improvement 20. believing that most people want to do 
with my top management. 
----
a good job. 
----
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The [Public] Hospital Mission statement* 
The [Public] Hospital's Board of Governors, 
Physicians, Support Staff, Auxiliary and Volunteers are 
committed to the provision of quality care and services 
and to the management of our resources. Through the 
process of continuous improvement we will strive to meet 
the changing individual and collective needs and 
expectations of patients, community, and staff. 
We will: 
Provide excellence in Chronic Care and Rehabilitation 
services to the residents of [city] and the [locale] 
Region. 
utilize an interdisciplinary team to identify, plan, 
implement and evaluate the individual care needs of those 
entrusted to our care and assist them to function at their 
optimal level. 
Demonstrate a spirit of partnership and mutual 
respect in all our relationships. 
Interaot with the community to define our role in the 
continuum of healthcare. 
"Care in Aotion" 
* To honor a commitment to anonymity, the Mission 
statement has been retyped, and name and location of the 
hospital excluded. 
Appendix H 
Department Manager Question Lines 
1. What do you believe is the mission of The Public 
Hospital? 
2. How do you see that mission being demonstrated in 
behaviors? 
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3. What do you see as the future direction of The Public 
Hospital? 
4. What will you and your staff require to be prepared 
to work in health care in the future? 
5. What are the unspoken rules in the organization? How 
do you know that these norms exist? 
6. How does one get ahead at the hospital? 
7. How do people tend to communicate with each other? 
How is information moved throughout the organization? 
8. Do you receive the information you need? If not, why 
not? What information would you like that you do not 
now receive? 
9. Who are your heros at the hospital? Why? 
10. Are there rituals within the organization? Describe 
them. What and how does the staff celebrate 
together? 
11. How would you explain the differences in the 
aggregate scores (OCRS and OCOS) of the Board and 
those of the managers? 
12. What are the values of the hospital as found in the 
Mission statement? Do you believe these are the 
values in action? Explain. 
13. If you were to think of the organization as a family, 
how would you describe family life? 
14. Tell me about your experience in your interactions 
with senior management, especially the Department 
Head's meeting. 
15. Some of your peers have raised the issue of a gender 
bias at The Public Hospital? What has your 
experience been in this regard? 
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16. How do you know if you're doing a good job? In what 
way has the organization invested in continuing 
education or skills development for you? 
Board Member Question Lines 
1. How would you describe the Mission of The Public 
Hospital? 
2. What course has the Board determined for the future of 
the hospital? 
3. How does the Board enable the hospital to fulfill 
its Mission? 
4. What is the role of the hospital Board? 
5. Should the Board retain its present structure and 
volunteer status? 
6. On what criteria does the Board appraise the 
performance of a CEO? 
7. How do you know that the quality of care is considered 
to be excellent? 
8. Can you speak to the experience of staff in their 
daily worklife? 
